+/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
/*
* kdc/do_tgs_req.c
*
- * Copyright 1990,1991 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
+ * Copyright 1990,1991,2001,2007,2008,2009 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* Export of this software from the United States of America may
* require a specific license from the United States Government.
* It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
* export to obtain such a license before exporting.
- *
+ *
* WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
* distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
* without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
* this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
* the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
* to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
- * permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label
+ * your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a
+ * fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software.
+ * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
* this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
* or implied warranty.
- *
+ *
*
* KDC Routines to deal with TGS_REQ's
*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2008, Novell, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * * The copyright holder's name is not used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
#include "k5-int.h"
-#include "com_err.h"
#include <syslog.h>
#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
#include "policy.h"
#include "extern.h"
#include "adm_proto.h"
+#include <ctype.h>
+static void
+find_alternate_tgs(krb5_kdc_req *,krb5_db_entry *,
+ krb5_boolean *,int *);
-static void find_alternate_tgs PROTOTYPE((krb5_kdc_req *,
- krb5_db_entry *,
- krb5_boolean *,
- int *));
+static krb5_error_code
+prepare_error_tgs(struct kdc_request_state *, krb5_kdc_req *,krb5_ticket *,int,
+ krb5_principal,krb5_data **,const char *, krb5_data *);
-static krb5_error_code prepare_error_tgs PROTOTYPE((krb5_kdc_req *,
- krb5_ticket *,
- int,
- const char *,
- krb5_data **));
+static krb5_int32
+prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req *,krb5_principal *);
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
-process_tgs_req(pkt, from, portnum, response)
-krb5_data *pkt;
-const krb5_fulladdr *from; /* who sent it ? */
-int portnum;
-krb5_data **response; /* filled in with a response packet */
+process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
+ krb5_data **response)
{
- krb5_keyblock * subkey;
+ krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
+ krb5_keyblock * tgskey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry server;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
+ krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
int nprincs = 0;
krb5_boolean more;
- krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0;
+ krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
- krb5_timestamp until, rtime;
- krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
+ krb5_timestamp rtime;
+ krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
+ krb5_keyblock *mkey_ptr;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
- char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *tmp = 0, *fromstring = 0;
+ char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *altcname = 0;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
-/* krb5_address *noaddrarray[1]; */
krb5_enctype useenctype;
- int errcode, errcode2;
+ int errcode, errcode2;
register int i;
int firstpass = 1;
- const char *status = 0;
+ const char *status = 0;
+ krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */
+ krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */
+ krb5_db_entry client, krbtgt;
+ int c_nprincs = 0, k_nprincs = 0;
+ krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
+ krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
+ unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
+ char *s4u_name = NULL;
+ krb5_boolean is_referral, db_ref_done = FALSE;
+ const char *emsg = NULL;
+ krb5_data *tgs_1 =NULL, *server_1 = NULL;
+ krb5_principal krbtgt_princ;
+ krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
+ struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
+ krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
+ krb5_data scratch;
+ krb5_data e_data = empty_data(); /* backend-provided error data */
+
+ reply.padata = 0; /* For cleanup handler */
+ reply_encpart.enc_padata = 0;
+ e_data.data = NULL;
+
+ session_key.contents = NULL;
- session_key.contents = 0;
-
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
- return retval;
+ return retval;
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
- if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server)))
- return retval;
-
-#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
- if (from->address->addrtype == ADDRTYPE_INET)
- fromstring =
- (char *) inet_ntoa(*(struct in_addr *)from->address->contents);
-#endif
- if (!fromstring)
- fromstring = "<unknown>";
-
- if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
- status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
- goto cleanup;
+ if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
+ krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
+ return retval;
}
- limit_string(sname);
-
- /* errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &req_authdat); */
- errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket, &subkey);
-
+ errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
+ &krbtgt, &k_nprincs, &tgskey,
+ &subkey, &pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
- (errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
- header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
- &cname))) {
- status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
- errcode = errcode2;
- goto cleanup;
+ (errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
+ header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
+ &cname))) {
+ status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
+ errcode = errcode2;
+ goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(cname);
-
+
if (errcode) {
- status = "PROCESS_TGS";
- goto cleanup;
+ status = "PROCESS_TGS";
+ goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
- errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
- status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
- goto cleanup;
+ errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
+ status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ errcode = kdc_make_rstate(&state);
+ if (errcode !=0) {
+ status = "making state";
+ goto cleanup;
}
-
+ scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
+ scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
+ errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey,
+ header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state);
+ if (errcode !=0) {
+ status = "kdc_find_fast";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
+ * replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
+ * if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
+ * special cases for constrained delegation.
+ */
+ header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
+
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
- authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
-
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
+ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
+ setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
+ setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
+ }
+
+ db_ref_done = FALSE;
+ref_tgt_again:
nprincs = 1;
- if ((errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, request->server, &server,
- &nprincs, &more))) {
- status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
- nprincs = 0;
- goto cleanup;
+ if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
+ status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ limit_string(sname);
+
+ errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
+ request->server,
+ s_flags,
+ &server,
+ &nprincs,
+ &more);
+ if (errcode) {
+ status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
+ nprincs = 0;
+ goto cleanup;
}
tgt_again:
if (more) {
- status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL";
- errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
- goto cleanup;
+ status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL";
+ errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
+ goto cleanup;
} else if (nprincs != 1) {
- /*
- * might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
- * should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
- */
- if (firstpass && krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) {
- if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
- krb5_data *server_1 =
- krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
- krb5_data *tgs_1 =
- krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
-
- if (server_1->length != tgs_1->length ||
- memcmp(server_1->data, tgs_1->data, tgs_1->length)) {
- krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
- find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
- firstpass = 0;
- goto tgt_again;
- }
- }
- }
- krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
- status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
- errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
- goto cleanup;
+ /*
+ * might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
+ * should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
+ */
+ if (firstpass ) {
+
+ if ( krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) {
+ /* Principal is a name of krb ticket service */
+ if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
+
+ server_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context,
+ request->server, 1);
+ tgs_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
+
+ if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
+ find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
+ firstpass = 0;
+ goto tgt_again;
+ }
+ }
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
+ status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
+ errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ } else if ( db_ref_done == FALSE) {
+ retval = prep_reprocess_req(request, &krbtgt_princ);
+ if (!retval) {
+ krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
+ retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ,
+ &(request->server));
+ if (!retval) {
+ db_ref_done = TRUE;
+ if (sname != NULL)
+ free(sname);
+ goto ref_tgt_again;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
+ status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
+ errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
+ goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
- status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
- goto cleanup;
+ status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
+ goto cleanup;
}
-
+
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket,
- kdc_time, &status))) {
- if (!status)
- status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
- errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
- goto cleanup;
+ kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
+ if (!status)
+ status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
+ errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
+ goto cleanup;
}
+ if (!is_local_principal(header_enc_tkt->client))
+ setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
+
+ is_referral = krb5_is_tgs_principal(server.princ) &&
+ !krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, tgs_server, server.princ);
+
+ /* Check for protocol transition */
+ errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_context,
+ request,
+ header_enc_tkt->client,
+ &server,
+ subkey,
+ header_enc_tkt->session,
+ kdc_time,
+ &s4u_x509_user,
+ &client,
+ &c_nprincs,
+ &status);
+ if (errcode)
+ goto cleanup;
+ if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
+ setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
+
/*
* We pick the session keytype here....
- *
+ *
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* to anything else.
*/
useenctype = 0;
- if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
- krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
- krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
- krb5_enctype etype;
-
- /*
- * Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
- */
- if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
- &st_sealing_key,
- &st_srv_kvno))) {
- status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
- goto cleanup;
- }
- errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
- request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
- krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
- if (errcode) {
- status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
- if (!valid_enctype(etype)) {
- status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
- errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
- if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
- useenctype = etype;
- break;
- }
- }
+ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY |
+ KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
+ krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
+ krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
+ krb5_enctype etype;
+ krb5_db_entry st_client;
+ int st_nprincs = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
+ */
+ if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
+ c_flags,
+ TRUE, /* match_enctype */
+ &st_client,
+ &st_nprincs,
+ &st_sealing_key,
+ &st_srv_kvno))) {
+ status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
+ request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
+ krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
+ if (errcode) {
+ status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
+ if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
+ status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
+ errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
+ if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
+ useenctype = etype;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
+ /* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
+ errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_context,
+ request,
+ request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
+ &st_client,
+ header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
+ request->server,
+ &status);
+ if (errcode)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
+
+ assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
+
+ assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
+
+ client = st_client;
+ c_nprincs = st_nprincs;
+ } else {
+ /* "client" is not used for user2user */
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
+ }
}
/*
* Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
*/
if ((useenctype == 0) &&
- (useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server,
- request->nktypes,
- request->ktype)) == 0) {
- /* unsupported ktype */
- status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
- errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
+ (useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server,
+ request->nktypes,
+ request->ktype)) == 0) {
+ /* unsupported ktype */
+ status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
+ errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
if (errcode) {
- /* random key failed */
- status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
- goto cleanup;
+ /* random key failed */
+ status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
+ goto cleanup;
}
- ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
+ /*
+ * subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained
+ * delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is
+ * necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields:
+ * the others could be forged by a malicious server.
+ */
+
+ if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
+ subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
+ else
+ subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt;
+ authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
+
+ if (is_referral)
+ ticket_reply.server = server.princ;
+ else
+ ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
+ if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
+
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
- if (!(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime))
- header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime =
- header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
+ if (!(header_enc_tkt->times.starttime))
+ header_enc_tkt->times.starttime = authtime;
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP);
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
- enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
+ enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
- reply_encpart.caddrs = 0; /* optional...don't put it in */
+ reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
+ reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
- /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
- /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
- /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
+ /*
+ * It should be noted that local policy may affect the
+ * processing of any of these flags. For example, some
+ * realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets
+ */
- if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE))
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
+ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
+
+ if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
+ /*
+ * If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
+ * unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
+ * different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
+ * (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
+ *
+ * Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
+ * validate_forwardable().
+ */
+ if (c_nprincs &&
+ isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
+ clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
+ /*
+ * Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path.
+ */
+ else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE))
+ clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
+ /*
+ * OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
+ * S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
+ */
+ else if (!is_referral &&
+ !isflagset(server.attributes,
+ KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
+ clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
+ }
+ }
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
- /* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
+ /* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
- enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
- reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
- }
- if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
+ enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
+ reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
+ }
+ if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
- /* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
+ /* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
- enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
- reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
+ enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
+ reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
- enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
- enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
- /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
- to the caller */
- ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
- enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
- clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
+ assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
+ /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
+ to the caller */
+ ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
+ enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
+ clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
- krb5_deltat old_life;
+ krb5_deltat old_life;
- /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
- to the caller */
- ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
- enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
+ assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
+ /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
+ to the caller */
+ ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
+ enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
- old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
+ old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
- enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
- enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
- min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
- kdc_time + old_life);
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
+ min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
+ kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
- /* not a renew request */
- enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
- until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till;
- enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
- min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life,
- min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm,
- header_ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime)));
- if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
- (enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
- isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags,
- TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
- setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
- request->rtime =
- min(request->till,
- header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till);
- }
+ /* not a renew request */
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
+
+ kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_context,
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime,
+ header_enc_tkt->times.endtime,
+ request->till,
+ &client,
+ &server,
+ &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime);
+
+ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
+ (enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
+ isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
+ setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
+ request->rtime =
+ min(request->till, header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till);
+ }
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
- /* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
- renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
- enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
- min(rtime,
- min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
- enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
- min(server.max_renewable_life,
- max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
+ /* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
+ renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
+ min(rtime,
+ min(header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till,
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
+ min(server.max_renewable_life,
+ max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
- enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
-
+ if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
/*
- * Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's
+ * Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's
*/
- enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
-
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime;
+
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
- if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
+ if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
+
+ if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
+ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
- if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
- setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
-
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
- enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
-
- /* assemble any authorization data */
- if (request->authorization_data.ciphertext.data) {
- krb5_data scratch;
-
- scratch.length = request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length;
- if (!(scratch.data =
- malloc(request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length))) {
- status = "AUTH_NOMEM";
- errcode = ENOMEM;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- if ((errcode = krb5_c_decrypt(kdc_context,
- header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
- KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SESSKEY,
- 0, &request->authorization_data,
- &scratch))) {
- status = "AUTH_ENCRYPT_FAIL";
- free(scratch.data);
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- /* scratch now has the authorization data, so we decode it */
- errcode = decode_krb5_authdata(&scratch, &(request->unenc_authdata));
- free(scratch.data);
- if (errcode) {
- status = "AUTH_DECODE";
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- if ((errcode =
- concat_authorization_data(request->unenc_authdata,
- header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data,
- &enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data))) {
- status = "CONCAT_AUTH";
- goto cleanup;
- }
- } else
- enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data =
- header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data;
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
+
+ if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
+ errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user->user_id.user,
+ &s4u_name);
+ } else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
+ errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
+ &s4u_name);
+ } else {
+ errcode = 0;
+ }
+ if (errcode) {
+ status = "UNPARSING S4U CLIENT";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
+ krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
+ encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Find the server key
+ */
+ if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server,
+ -1, /* ignore keytype */
+ -1, /* Ignore salttype */
+ 0, /* Get highest kvno */
+ &server_key))) {
+ status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist, &server,
+ &mkey_ptr))) {
+ krb5_keylist_node *tmp_mkey_list;
+ /* try refreshing master key list */
+ /* XXX it would nice if we had the mkvno here for optimization */
+ if (krb5_db_fetch_mkey_list(kdc_context, master_princ,
+ &master_keyblock, 0, &tmp_mkey_list) == 0) {
+ krb5_dbe_free_key_list(kdc_context, master_keylist);
+ master_keylist = tmp_mkey_list;
+ if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist,
+ &server, &mkey_ptr))) {
+ status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } else {
+ status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert server.key into a real key
+ * (it may be encrypted in the database)
+ */
+ if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context,
+ mkey_ptr,
+ server_key, &encrypting_key,
+ NULL))) {
+ status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
+ /*
+ * Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
+ * delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
+ * the ability to validate that delegation was used.
+ */
+ clear(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
+ }
+ if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
+ * try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional
+ * authorization information.
+ *
+ * Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
+ * because we must validate the KDC signatures.
+ */
+ if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) {
+ /* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
+ setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
+ /* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
+ setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
+
+ assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* should not have been looked up already */
+
+ c_nprincs = 1;
+ errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
+ subject_tkt->client,
+ c_flags,
+ &client,
+ &c_nprincs,
+ &more);
+ /*
+ * We can ignore errors because the principal may be a
+ * valid cross-realm principal for which we have no local
+ * mapping. But we do want to check that at most one entry
+ * was returned.
+ */
+ if (errcode == 0 && (more || c_nprincs > 1)) {
+ errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else if (errcode) {
+ c_nprincs = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
+
+ if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
+ !isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
+ enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
+ else
+ enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
- enc_tkt_reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
+ errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
+ c_flags,
+ (c_nprincs != 0) ? &client : NULL,
+ &server,
+ (k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL,
+ subkey != NULL ? subkey :
+ header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
+ &encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
+ tgskey,
+ pkt,
+ request,
+ s4u_x509_user ?
+ s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
+ subject_tkt,
+ &enc_tkt_reply);
+ if (errcode) {
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)", errcode);
+ status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+
/*
- * Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
+ * Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
-
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
- realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
- /* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
- enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_ticket->enc_part2->transited;
+ realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
+ /* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
+ enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
- /* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
- /* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
- if (header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type !=
- KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
- status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
- errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
- enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
- enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
- enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
- if ((errcode =
- add_to_transited(&header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents,
- &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
- header_ticket->server,
- enc_tkt_reply.client,
- request->server))) {
- status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
- goto cleanup;
- }
- newtransited = 1;
+ /* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
+ /* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
+ if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
+ KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
+ status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
+ errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
+ enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
+ enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
+ enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
+ enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
+ enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
+ if ((errcode =
+ add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
+ &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
+ header_ticket->server,
+ enc_tkt_reply.client,
+ request->server))) {
+ status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ newtransited = 1;
+ }
+ if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
+ errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
+ &server,
+ (k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL);
+ if (errcode) {
+ status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
+ unsigned int tlen;
+ char *tdots;
+
+ errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
+ &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
+ krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
+ krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
+ tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
+ tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
+ tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
+
+ if (errcode == 0) {
+ setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
+ } else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
+ krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO,
+ "bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' "
+ "via '%.*s%s'",
+ cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
+ sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
+ tlen,
+ enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
+ tdots);
+ else {
+ emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
+ krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR,
+ "unexpected error checking transit from "
+ "'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s",
+ cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
+ sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
+ tlen,
+ enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
+ tdots, emsg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
+ emsg = NULL;
+ }
+ } else
+ krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path");
+ if (reject_bad_transit
+ && !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
+ errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
+ status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
+ goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
- /*
- * Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
- * requested server.
- */
- if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server,
- request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->client)) {
- if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
- request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->client,
- &tmp)))
- tmp = 0;
- krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "TGS_REQ %s(%d): 2ND_TKT_MISMATCH: authtime %d, %s for %s, 2nd tkt client %s",
- fromstring, portnum, authtime,
- cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
- sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
- tmp ? tmp : "<unknown>");
- errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;
- ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype =
- request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
- if ((errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context,
- request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session,
- &ticket_reply))) {
- status = "2ND_TKT_ENCRYPT";
- goto cleanup;
- }
- st_idx++;
+ /*
+ * Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
+ * requested server.
+ */
+ krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
+ krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
+ if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
+ if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &altcname)))
+ altcname = 0;
+ if (altcname != NULL)
+ limit_string(altcname);
+
+ errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
+ status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ticket_kvno = 0;
+ ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
+ st_idx++;
} else {
- /*
- * Find the server key
- */
- if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server,
- -1, /* ignore keytype */
- -1, /* Ignore salttype */
- 0, /* Get highest kvno */
- &server_key))) {
- status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
- goto cleanup;
- }
- /* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted
- * in the database) */
- if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context,
- &master_keyblock,
- server_key, &encrypting_key,
- NULL))) {
- status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
- goto cleanup;
- }
- if ((encrypting_key.enctype == ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC) &&
- (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_SUPPORT_DESMD5)))
- encrypting_key.enctype = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5;
- errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
- &ticket_reply);
- krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
- if (errcode) {
- status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
- goto cleanup;
- }
- ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
+ ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
+ errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
+ &ticket_reply);
+ if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
+ if (errcode) {
+ status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
- reply.padata = 0; /* always */
- reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
- reply.enc_part.kvno = 0; /* We are using the session key */
+ if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
+ find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
+ errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
+ subkey,
+ header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
+ s4u_x509_user,
+ &reply,
+ &reply_encpart);
+ if (errcode) {
+ status = "KDC_RETURN_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
+ reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
- /* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location
- is used for ktime */
+ /* copy the time fields */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
- reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
- enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
+ enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
- reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
- reply_encpart.key_exp = 0; /* ditto */
+ reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
+ reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
-
+
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
-
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
- header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
- errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
- subkey ? 1 : 0,
- subkey ? subkey :
- header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
- &reply, response);
+ header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
+ errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
+ subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
+ if (errcode !=0 ) {
+ status = "Preparing FAST padata";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state,
+ subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
- status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
+ status = "generating reply key";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (is_referral && isflagset(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE)) {
+ int idx = 0;
+
+ errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request,
+ reply_key, &server, &reply_encpart);
+ if (errcode) {
+ status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ /* Not referral. */
+ reply_encpart.enc_padata = calloc(3, sizeof(krb5_pa_data *));
+ if (reply_encpart.enc_padata == NULL) {
+ errcode = ENOMEM;
+ status = "Allocating enc_padata";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ errcode = kdc_handle_protected_negotiation(pkt, request, reply_key,
+ reply_encpart.enc_padata,
+ &idx);
+ if (errcode != 0) {
+ status = "protected negotiation";
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
+ subkey ? 1 : 0,
+ reply_key,
+ &reply, response);
+ if (errcode) {
+ status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
- status = "ISSUE";
+ status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
- ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
+ ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
- reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
+ reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
-
+
cleanup:
- if (status)
- krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "TGS_REQ %s(%d): %s: authtime %d, %s for %s%s%s",
- fromstring, portnum, status, authtime,
- cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
- sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
- errcode ? ", " : "",
- errcode ? error_message(errcode) : "");
+ assert(status != NULL);
+ if (reply_key)
+ krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
+ if (errcode)
+ emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
+ log_tgs_req(from, request, &reply, cname, sname, altcname, authtime,
+ c_flags, s4u_name, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
- errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
- if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
- errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-
- retval = prepare_error_tgs(request, header_ticket, errcode,
- fromstring, response);
- }
-
- if (header_ticket)
- krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
- if (request)
- krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
- if (cname)
- free(cname);
- if (sname)
- free(sname);
- if (nprincs)
- krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1);
- if (session_key.contents)
- krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
+ krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
+ emsg = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (errcode) {
+ int got_err = 0;
+ if (status == 0) {
+ status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
+ got_err = 1;
+ }
+ errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
+ if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
+ errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+
+ retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
+ nprincs ? server.princ : NULL,
+ response, status, &e_data);
+ if (got_err) {
+ krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
+ status = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (header_ticket != NULL)
+ krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
+ if (request != NULL)
+ krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
+ if (state)
+ kdc_free_rstate(state);
+ if (cname != NULL)
+ free(cname);
+ if (sname != NULL)
+ free(sname);
+ if (nprincs != 0)
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1);
+ if (session_key.contents != NULL)
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
- free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
+ free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
+ if (k_nprincs)
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &krbtgt, k_nprincs);
+ if (c_nprincs)
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &client, c_nprincs);
+ if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
+ krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
+ if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
+ krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
+ if (s4u_name != NULL)
+ free(s4u_name);
+ if (subkey != NULL)
+ krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
+ if (tgskey != NULL)
+ krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, tgskey);
+ if (reply.padata)
+ krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
+ if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
+ krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
+ krb5_free_data_contents(kdc_context, &e_data);
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
-prepare_error_tgs (request, ticket, error, ident, response)
-register krb5_kdc_req *request;
-krb5_ticket *ticket;
-int error;
-const char *ident;
-krb5_data **response;
+prepare_error_tgs (struct kdc_request_state *state,
+ krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_ticket *ticket, int error,
+ krb5_principal canon_server,
+ krb5_data **response, const char *status,
+ krb5_data *e_data)
{
krb5_error errpkt;
- krb5_error_code retval;
+ krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_data *scratch;
errpkt.ctime = request->nonce;
errpkt.cusec = 0;
if ((retval = krb5_us_timeofday(kdc_context, &errpkt.stime,
- &errpkt.susec)))
- return(retval);
+ &errpkt.susec)))
+ return(retval);
errpkt.error = error;
errpkt.server = request->server;
if (ticket && ticket->enc_part2)
- errpkt.client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
+ errpkt.client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
else
- errpkt.client = 0;
- errpkt.text.length = strlen(error_message(error+KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE))+1;
- if (!(errpkt.text.data = malloc(errpkt.text.length)))
- return ENOMEM;
- (void) strcpy(errpkt.text.data, error_message(error+KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE));
+ errpkt.client = NULL;
+ errpkt.text.length = strlen(status) + 1;
+ if (!(errpkt.text.data = strdup(status)))
+ return ENOMEM;
if (!(scratch = (krb5_data *)malloc(sizeof(*scratch)))) {
- free(errpkt.text.data);
- return ENOMEM;
+ free(errpkt.text.data);
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+ errpkt.e_data = *e_data;
+ if (state)
+ retval = kdc_fast_handle_error(kdc_context, state, request, NULL, &errpkt);
+ if (retval) {
+ free(scratch);
+ free(errpkt.text.data);
+ return retval;
}
- errpkt.e_data.length = 0;
- errpkt.e_data.data = 0;
-
retval = krb5_mk_error(kdc_context, &errpkt, scratch);
free(errpkt.text.data);
- *response = scratch;
+ if (retval)
+ free(scratch);
+ else
+ *response = scratch;
+
return retval;
}
* some intermediate realm.
*/
static void
-find_alternate_tgs(request, server, more, nprincs)
-krb5_kdc_req *request;
-krb5_db_entry *server;
-krb5_boolean *more;
-int *nprincs;
+find_alternate_tgs(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry *server,
+ krb5_boolean *more, int *nprincs)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_principal *plist, *pl2;
* somewhere that has already checked the number of components in
* the principal.
*/
- if ((retval = krb5_walk_realm_tree(kdc_context,
- krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server),
- krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1),
- &plist, KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR)))
- return;
+ if ((retval = krb5_walk_realm_tree(kdc_context,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server),
+ krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1),
+ &plist, KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR)))
+ return;
/* move to the end */
for (pl2 = plist; *pl2; pl2++);
/* the first entry in this array is for krbtgt/local@local, so we
ignore it */
while (--pl2 > plist) {
- *nprincs = 1;
- tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
- krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
- krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
- retval = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, server, nprincs, more);
- krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
- if (retval) {
- *nprincs = 0;
- *more = FALSE;
- krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
- return;
- }
- if (*more) {
- krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
- continue;
- } else if (*nprincs == 1) {
- /* Found it! */
- krb5_principal tmpprinc;
- char *sname;
-
- tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
- krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
- krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
- if ((retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmpprinc))) {
- krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
- krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
- continue;
- }
- krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
-
- krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
- request->server = tmpprinc;
- if (krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname)) {
- krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
- "TGS_REQ: issuing alternate <un-unparseable> TGT");
- } else {
- krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
- "TGS_REQ: issuing TGT %s", sname);
- free(sname);
- }
- return;
- }
- krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
- continue;
+ *nprincs = 1;
+ tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
+ krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
+ retval = get_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, server, nprincs, more);
+ krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
+ if (retval) {
+ *nprincs = 0;
+ *more = FALSE;
+ krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (*more) {
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
+ continue;
+ } else if (*nprincs == 1) {
+ /* Found it! */
+ krb5_principal tmpprinc;
+
+ tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
+ krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
+ if ((retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmpprinc))) {
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
+ krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
+
+ krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
+ request->server = tmpprinc;
+ log_tgs_alt_tgt(request->server);
+ krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
+ return;
+ }
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
+ continue;
}
*nprincs = 0;
return;
}
+static krb5_int32
+prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
+{
+ krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
+ char **realms, **cpp, *temp_buf=NULL;
+ krb5_data *comp1 = NULL, *comp2 = NULL;
+ char *comp1_str = NULL;
+
+ /* By now we know that server principal name is unknown.
+ * If CANONICALIZE flag is set in the request
+ * If req is not U2U authn. req
+ * the requested server princ. has exactly two components
+ * either
+ * the name type is NT-SRV-HST
+ * or name type is NT-UNKNOWN and
+ * the 1st component is listed in conf file under host_based_services
+ * the 1st component is not in a list in conf under "no_host_referral"
+ * the 2d component looks like fully-qualified domain name (FQDN)
+ * If all of these conditions are satisfied - try mapping the FQDN and
+ * re-process the request as if client had asked for cross-realm TGT.
+ */
+ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE) &&
+ !isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) &&
+ krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
+
+ comp1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 0);
+ comp2 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
+
+ comp1_str = calloc(1,comp1->length+1);
+ if (!comp1_str) {
+ retval = ENOMEM;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ strlcpy(comp1_str,comp1->data,comp1->length+1);
+
+ if ((krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST ||
+ (krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN &&
+ kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services != NULL &&
+ (krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services,
+ comp1_str) == TRUE ||
+ krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services,
+ KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK) == TRUE))) &&
+ (kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral == NULL ||
+ (krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral,
+ KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK) == FALSE &&
+ krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral,
+ comp1_str) == FALSE))) {
+
+ if (memchr(comp2->data, '.', comp2->length) == NULL)
+ goto cleanup;
+ temp_buf = calloc(1, comp2->length+1);
+ if (!temp_buf) {
+ retval = ENOMEM;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ strlcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data,comp2->length+1);
+ retval = krb5int_get_domain_realm_mapping(kdc_context, temp_buf, &realms);
+ free(temp_buf);
+ if (retval) {
+ /* no match found */
+ kdc_err(kdc_context, retval, "unable to find realm of host");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (realms == 0) {
+ retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (realms[0] == 0) {
+ free(realms);
+ retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ /* Modify request.
+ * Construct cross-realm tgt : krbtgt/REMOTE_REALM@LOCAL_REALM
+ * and use it as a principal in this req.
+ */
+ retval = krb5_build_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ,
+ (*request->server).realm.length,
+ (*request->server).realm.data,
+ "krbtgt", realms[0], (char *)0);
+ for (cpp = realms; *cpp; cpp++)
+ free(*cpp);
+ }
+ }
+cleanup:
+ free(comp1_str);
+
+ return retval;
+}
projects / krb5.git / blobdiff