4 * Copyright 1990,1991,2001,2007,2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
7 * Export of this software from the United States of America may
8 * require a specific license from the United States Government.
9 * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
10 * export to obtain such a license before exporting.
12 * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
13 * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
14 * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
15 * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
16 * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
17 * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
18 * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
19 * permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label
20 * your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a
21 * fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software.
22 * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
23 * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
24 * or implied warranty.
27 * KDC Routines to deal with TGS_REQ's
30 * Copyright (c) 2006-2008, Novell, Inc.
31 * All rights reserved.
33 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
34 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
36 * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
37 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
38 * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
39 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
40 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
41 * * The copyright holder's name is not used to endorse or promote products
42 * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
44 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
45 * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
46 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
47 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
48 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
49 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
50 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
51 * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
52 * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
53 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
54 * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
61 #ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
62 #include <sys/types.h>
63 #include <netinet/in.h>
65 #include <arpa/inet.h>
72 #include "adm_proto.h"
75 static void find_alternate_tgs (krb5_kdc_req *, krb5_db_entry *,
76 krb5_boolean *, int *);
78 static krb5_error_code prepare_error_tgs (krb5_kdc_req *, krb5_ticket *,
80 krb5_data **, const char *);
84 process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
87 krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
88 krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
91 krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
92 krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
94 krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
95 krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
97 krb5_error_code retval = 0;
100 krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0;
101 krb5_keyblock session_key;
102 krb5_timestamp until, rtime;
103 krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
104 krb5_key_data *server_key;
105 char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *altcname = 0;
106 krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
107 /* krb5_address *noaddrarray[1]; */
108 krb5_enctype useenctype;
109 int errcode, errcode2;
112 const char *status = 0;
113 krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* ticket granting or evidence ticket */
114 krb5_db_entry client, krbtgt;
115 int c_nprincs = 0, k_nprincs = 0;
116 krb5_pa_for_user *for_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
117 krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
118 unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
119 char *s4u_name = NULL;
120 krb5_boolean is_referral;
121 const char *emsg = NULL;
123 session_key.contents = NULL;
125 retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
130 * setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
132 if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
133 krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
137 if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
138 status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
143 /* errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &req_authdat); */
144 errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
145 &krbtgt, &k_nprincs, &subkey);
146 if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
147 (errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
148 header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
150 status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
157 status = "PROCESS_TGS";
161 if (!header_ticket) {
162 errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
163 status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
168 * Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
169 * replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
170 * if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
171 * special cases for constrained delegation.
173 header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
176 * We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
177 * use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
178 * decrypted with the session key.
181 /* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
185 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
186 setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
187 setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
190 errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
197 status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
203 status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL";
204 errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
206 } else if (nprincs != 1) {
208 * might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
209 * should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
211 if (firstpass && krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) {
212 if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
213 krb5_data *server_1 =
214 krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
216 krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
218 if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
219 krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
220 find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
226 krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
227 status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
228 errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
232 if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
233 status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
237 if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket,
238 kdc_time, &status))) {
240 status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
241 errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
245 if (!is_local_principal(header_enc_tkt->client))
246 setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
248 is_referral = krb5_is_tgs_principal(server.princ) &&
249 !krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, tgs_server, server.princ);
251 /* Check for protocol transition */
252 errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_context, request, header_enc_tkt->client,
253 &server, header_enc_tkt->session, kdc_time,
254 &for_user, &client, &c_nprincs, &status);
257 if (for_user != NULL)
258 setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
261 * We pick the session keytype here....
263 * Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
264 * case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
265 * which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
266 * know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
267 * type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
268 * able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
272 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY |
273 KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
274 krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
275 krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
277 krb5_db_entry st_client;
281 * Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
283 if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
285 TRUE, /* match_enctype */
290 status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
293 errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
294 request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
295 krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
297 status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
298 krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
302 etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
303 if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
304 status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
305 errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
306 krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
310 for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
311 if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
317 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
318 /* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
319 errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_context,
321 request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
323 header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
329 setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
331 assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
333 /* From now on, use evidence ticket as header ticket */
334 header_enc_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
336 assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
339 c_nprincs = st_nprincs;
341 /* "client" is not used for user2user */
342 krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
347 * Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
349 if ((useenctype == 0) &&
350 (useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server,
352 request->ktype)) == 0) {
353 /* unsupported ktype */
354 status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
355 errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
359 errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
362 /* random key failed */
363 status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
367 authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
370 ticket_reply.server = server.princ;
372 ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
374 enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
375 enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
377 if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE) &&
379 /* Ensure that we are not returning a referral */
380 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
384 * Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
387 if (!(header_enc_tkt->times.starttime))
388 header_enc_tkt->times.starttime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
390 /* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
392 enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
393 /* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
394 reply_encpart.caddrs = 0; /* optional...don't put it in */
395 reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
397 /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
398 /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
399 /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
401 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE))
402 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
403 if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
404 if (!krb5_is_tgs_principal(server.princ) &&
405 is_local_principal(server.princ)) {
406 if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
407 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
409 clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
411 if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
412 clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
414 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
415 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
417 /* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
419 enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
420 reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
422 if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
423 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
425 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
426 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
428 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
429 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
431 /* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
433 enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
434 reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
437 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
438 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
440 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
441 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
442 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
443 enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
445 enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
447 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
448 assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
449 /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
451 ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
452 enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
453 clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
456 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
457 krb5_deltat old_life;
459 assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
460 /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
462 ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
463 enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
465 old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
467 enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
468 enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
469 min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
470 kdc_time + old_life);
472 /* not a renew request */
473 enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
474 until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till;
475 enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
476 min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life,
477 min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm,
478 header_enc_tkt->times.endtime)));
479 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
480 (enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
481 isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
482 setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
484 min(request->till, header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till);
487 rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
489 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
490 /* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
491 renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
492 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
493 enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
495 min(header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till,
496 enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
497 min(server.max_renewable_life,
498 max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
500 enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
504 * Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's
506 enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
509 * Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
511 if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
512 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
514 if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
515 setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
517 /* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
518 so we can nuke it if it matches */
519 if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
520 enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
522 if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
523 errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, for_user->user, &s4u_name);
524 } else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
525 errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client, &s4u_name);
530 status = "UNPARSING S4U CLIENT";
534 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
535 krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
536 encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
539 * Find the server key
541 if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server,
542 -1, /* ignore keytype */
543 -1, /* Ignore salttype */
544 0, /* Get highest kvno */
546 status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
549 /* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted
550 * in the database) */
551 if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context,
553 server_key, &encrypting_key,
555 status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
560 if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
562 * Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
563 * delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
564 * the ability to validate that delegation was used.
566 clear(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
568 if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
570 * If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
571 * and there was no authorization data included, try to lookup
572 * the client principal as it may be mapped to a local account.
574 * Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
575 * because we must validate the KDC signatures.
577 if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) &&
578 header_enc_tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
580 /* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
581 setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
582 /* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
583 setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
585 assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* should not have been looked up already */
588 errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
589 header_enc_tkt->client,
595 * We can ignore errors because the principal may be a
596 * valid cross-realm principal for which we have no local
597 * mapping. But we do want to check that at most one entry
600 if (errcode == 0 && (more || c_nprincs > 1)) {
601 errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
603 } else if (errcode) {
609 enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
611 if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
612 is_local_principal(header_enc_tkt->client))
613 enc_tkt_reply.client = for_user->user;
615 enc_tkt_reply.client = header_enc_tkt->client;
617 errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
619 (c_nprincs != 0) ? &client : NULL,
621 (k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL,
622 subkey != NULL ? subkey :
623 header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
624 &encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
627 for_user ? for_user->user : NULL,
631 krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)", errcode);
632 status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
636 if (is_referral && isflagset(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE)) {
637 errcode = return_svr_referral_data(kdc_context,
638 &server, &reply_encpart);
640 status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
645 enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
646 enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
647 enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
650 * Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
651 * it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
652 * than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
653 * implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
657 /* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
658 if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
659 realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
660 /* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
661 enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
663 /* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
664 /* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
665 if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
666 KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
667 status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
668 errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
671 enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
672 enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
673 enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
674 enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
675 enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
676 enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
678 add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
679 &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
680 header_ticket->server,
681 enc_tkt_reply.client,
683 status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
688 if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
689 errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
691 (k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL);
693 status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
697 if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
701 errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
702 &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
703 krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
704 krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
705 tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
706 tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
707 tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
710 setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
711 } else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
712 krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO,
713 "bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' "
715 cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
716 sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
718 enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
721 emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
722 krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR,
723 "unexpected error checking transit from "
724 "'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s",
725 cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
726 sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
728 enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
730 krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
734 krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path");
735 if (reject_bad_transit
736 && !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
737 errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
738 status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
742 ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
745 * If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
746 * that the client for the second ticket matches the request
747 * server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
750 if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
752 * Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
755 krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
756 krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
757 if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
758 if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &altcname)))
760 if (altcname != NULL)
761 limit_string(altcname);
763 errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
764 status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
768 ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;
769 ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
772 ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
775 errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
777 if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
778 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
780 status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
784 /* Start assembling the response */
785 reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
786 reply.padata = 0; /* always */
787 reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
788 reply.enc_part.kvno = 0; /* We are using the session key */
789 reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
791 reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
792 reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
794 /* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location
796 reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
797 reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
799 /* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
800 so we can nuke it if it matches */
801 if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
802 enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
804 nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
806 nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
808 reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
809 reply_encpart.key_exp = 0; /* ditto */
810 reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
811 reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
813 /* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
816 reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
817 header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
818 errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
821 header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
824 status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
829 memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
830 ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
831 free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
832 /* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
833 can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
834 memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
835 reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
836 free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
839 assert(status != NULL);
841 emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
842 log_tgs_req(from, request, &reply, cname, sname, altcname, authtime,
843 status, errcode, emsg);
845 krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
852 status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
855 errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
856 if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
857 errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
859 retval = prepare_error_tgs(request, header_ticket, errcode,
860 nprincs ? server.princ : NULL,
863 krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
868 if (header_ticket != NULL)
869 krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
871 krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
877 krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1);
878 if (session_key.contents != NULL)
879 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
881 free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
883 krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &krbtgt, k_nprincs);
885 krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &client, c_nprincs);
886 if (for_user != NULL)
887 krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
888 if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
889 krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
890 if (s4u_name != NULL)
893 krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
898 static krb5_error_code
899 prepare_error_tgs (krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_ticket *ticket, int error,
900 krb5_principal canon_server,
901 krb5_data **response, const char *status)
904 krb5_error_code retval;
907 errpkt.ctime = request->nonce;
910 if ((retval = krb5_us_timeofday(kdc_context, &errpkt.stime,
913 errpkt.error = error;
914 errpkt.server = request->server;
915 if (ticket && ticket->enc_part2)
916 errpkt.client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
918 errpkt.client = NULL;
919 errpkt.text.length = strlen(status) + 1;
920 if (!(errpkt.text.data = strdup(status)))
923 if (!(scratch = (krb5_data *)malloc(sizeof(*scratch)))) {
924 free(errpkt.text.data);
927 errpkt.e_data.length = 0;
928 errpkt.e_data.data = NULL;
930 retval = krb5_mk_error(kdc_context, &errpkt, scratch);
931 free(errpkt.text.data);
941 * The request seems to be for a ticket-granting service somewhere else,
942 * but we don't have a ticket for the final TGS. Try to give the requestor
943 * some intermediate realm.
946 find_alternate_tgs(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry *server,
947 krb5_boolean *more, int *nprincs)
949 krb5_error_code retval;
950 krb5_principal *plist, *pl2;
957 * Call to krb5_princ_component is normally not safe but is so
958 * here only because find_alternate_tgs() is only called from
959 * somewhere that has already checked the number of components in
962 if ((retval = krb5_walk_realm_tree(kdc_context,
963 krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server),
964 krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1),
965 &plist, KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR)))
968 /* move to the end */
969 for (pl2 = plist; *pl2; pl2++);
971 /* the first entry in this array is for krbtgt/local@local, so we
973 while (--pl2 > plist) {
975 tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
976 krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
977 krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
978 retval = get_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, server, nprincs, more);
979 krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
983 krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
987 krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
989 } else if (*nprincs == 1) {
991 krb5_principal tmpprinc;
993 tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
994 krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
995 krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
996 if ((retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmpprinc))) {
997 krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
998 krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
1001 krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
1003 krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
1004 request->server = tmpprinc;
1005 log_tgs_alt_tgt(request->server);
1006 krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
1009 krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
1015 krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);