spoofed preauth data. (Merely huge cpu time usage is probably still
possible.)
* aes_s2k.c (krb5int_aes_string_to_key): Return an error if the supplied
iteration count is really, really large.
ticket: 1418
status: open
git-svn-id: svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5/trunk@15349
dc483132-0cff-0310-8789-
dd5450dbe970
+2003-04-13 Ken Raeburn <raeburn@mit.edu>
+
+ * aes_s2k.c (krb5int_aes_string_to_key): Return an error if the
+ supplied iteration count is really, really large.
+
2003-03-04 Ken Raeburn <raeburn@mit.edu>
* aes_s2k.c, aes_s2k.h: New files.
} else
iter_count = 0xb000L;
+ /* This is not a protocol specification constraint; this is an
+ implementation limit, which should eventually be controlled by
+ a config file. */
+ if (iter_count >= 0x1000000L)
+ return KRB5_ERR_BAD_S2K_PARAMS;
+
/*
* Dense key space, no parity bits or anything, so take a shortcut
* and use the key contents buffer for the generated bytes.