+/* -*- mode: c; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
/*
* lib/krb5/krb/sendauth.c
*
* require a specific license from the United States Government.
* It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
* export to obtain such a license before exporting.
- *
+ *
* WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
* distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
* without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
* M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
* this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
* or implied warranty.
- *
+ *
*
* convenience sendauth/recvauth functions
*/
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_sendauth(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context,
- krb5_pointer fd, char *appl_version, krb5_principal client,
- krb5_principal server, krb5_flags ap_req_options,
- krb5_data *in_data, krb5_creds *in_creds, krb5_ccache ccache,
- krb5_error **error, krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **rep_result,
- krb5_creds **out_creds)
+ krb5_pointer fd, char *appl_version, krb5_principal client,
+ krb5_principal server, krb5_flags ap_req_options,
+ krb5_data *in_data, krb5_creds *in_creds, krb5_ccache ccache,
+ krb5_error **error, krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **rep_result,
+ krb5_creds **out_creds)
{
- krb5_octet result;
- krb5_creds creds;
- krb5_creds * credsp = NULL;
- krb5_creds * credspout = NULL;
- krb5_error_code retval = 0;
- krb5_data inbuf, outbuf[2];
- int len;
- krb5_ccache use_ccache = 0;
-
- if (error)
- *error = 0;
-
- /*
- * First, send over the length of the sendauth version string;
- * then, we send over the sendauth version. Next, we send
- * over the length of the application version strings followed
- * by the string itself.
- */
- outbuf[0].length = strlen(sendauth_version) + 1;
- outbuf[0].data = (char *) sendauth_version;
- outbuf[1].length = strlen(appl_version) + 1;
- outbuf[1].data = appl_version;
- if ((retval = krb5int_write_messages(context, fd, outbuf, 2)))
- return(retval);
- /*
- * Now, read back a byte: 0 means no error, 1 means bad sendauth
- * version, 2 means bad application version
- */
+ krb5_octet result;
+ krb5_creds creds;
+ krb5_creds * credsp = NULL;
+ krb5_creds * credspout = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code retval = 0;
+ krb5_data inbuf, outbuf[2];
+ int len;
+ krb5_ccache use_ccache = 0;
+
+ if (error)
+ *error = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * First, send over the length of the sendauth version string;
+ * then, we send over the sendauth version. Next, we send
+ * over the length of the application version strings followed
+ * by the string itself.
+ */
+ outbuf[0].length = strlen(sendauth_version) + 1;
+ outbuf[0].data = (char *) sendauth_version;
+ outbuf[1].length = strlen(appl_version) + 1;
+ outbuf[1].data = appl_version;
+ if ((retval = krb5int_write_messages(context, fd, outbuf, 2)))
+ return(retval);
+ /*
+ * Now, read back a byte: 0 means no error, 1 means bad sendauth
+ * version, 2 means bad application version
+ */
if ((len = krb5_net_read(context, *((int *) fd), (char *)&result, 1)) != 1)
- return((len < 0) ? errno : ECONNABORTED);
+ return((len < 0) ? errno : ECONNABORTED);
if (result == 1)
- return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS);
+ return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS);
else if (result == 2)
- return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS);
+ return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS);
else if (result != 0)
- return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADRESPONSE);
- /*
- * We're finished with the initial negotiations; let's get and
- * send over the authentication header. (The AP_REQ message)
- */
-
- /*
- * If no credentials were provided, try getting it from the
- * credentials cache.
- */
- memset((char *)&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-
- /*
- * See if we need to access the credentials cache
- */
- if (!in_creds || !in_creds->ticket.length) {
- if (ccache)
- use_ccache = ccache;
- else if ((retval = krb5int_cc_default(context, &use_ccache)))
- goto error_return;
- }
- if (!in_creds) {
- if ((retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, server,
- &creds.server)))
- goto error_return;
- if (client)
- retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, client,
- &creds.client);
- else
- retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, use_ccache,
- &creds.client);
- if (retval) {
- krb5_free_principal(context, creds.server);
- goto error_return;
- }
- /* creds.times.endtime = 0; -- memset 0 takes care of this
- zero means "as long as possible" */
- /* creds.keyblock.enctype = 0; -- as well as this.
- zero means no session enctype
- preference */
- in_creds = &creds;
- }
- if (!in_creds->ticket.length) {
- if ((retval = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0,
- use_ccache, in_creds, &credsp)))
- goto error_return;
- credspout = credsp;
- } else {
- credsp = in_creds;
- }
-
- if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY) {
- /* Provide some more fodder for random number code.
- This isn't strong cryptographically; the point here is
- not to guarantee randomness, but to make it less likely
- that multiple sessions could pick the same subkey. */
- char rnd_data[1024];
- GETPEERNAME_ARG3_TYPE len2;
- krb5_data d;
- d.length = sizeof (rnd_data);
- d.data = rnd_data;
- len2 = sizeof (rnd_data);
- if (getpeername (*(int*)fd, (GETPEERNAME_ARG2_TYPE *) rnd_data,
- &len2) == 0) {
- d.length = len2;
- (void) krb5_c_random_add_entropy (context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_EXTERNAL_PROTOCOL, &d);
- }
- len2 = sizeof (rnd_data);
- if (getsockname (*(int*)fd, (GETSOCKNAME_ARG2_TYPE *) rnd_data,
- &len2) == 0) {
- d.length = len2;
- (void) krb5_c_random_add_entropy (context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_EXTERNAL_PROTOCOL, &d);
- }
- }
-
- outbuf[0].data = NULL; /* Coverity is confused otherwise */
- if ((retval = krb5_mk_req_extended(context, auth_context,
- ap_req_options, in_data, credsp,
- &outbuf[0])))
- goto error_return;
-
- /*
- * First write the length of the AP_REQ message, then write
- * the message itself.
- */
- retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf[0]);
- free(outbuf[0].data);
- if (retval)
- goto error_return;
-
- /*
- * Now, read back a message. If it was a null message (the
- * length was zero) then there was no error. If not, we the
- * authentication was rejected, and we need to return the
- * error structure.
- */
- if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
- goto error_return;
-
- if (inbuf.length) {
- if (error) {
- if ((retval = krb5_rd_error(context, &inbuf, error))) {
- free(inbuf.data);
- goto error_return;
- }
- }
- retval = KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED;
- free(inbuf.data);
- goto error_return;
- }
-
- /*
- * If we asked for mutual authentication, we should now get a
- * length field, followed by a AP_REP message
- */
- if ((ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)) {
- krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *repl = 0;
-
- if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
- goto error_return;
-
- if ((retval = krb5_rd_rep(context, *auth_context, &inbuf,
- &repl))) {
- if (repl)
- krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
- free(inbuf.data);
- goto error_return;
- }
-
- free(inbuf.data);
- /*
- * If the user wants to look at the AP_REP message,
- * copy it for him
- */
- if (rep_result)
- *rep_result = repl;
- else
- krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
- }
- retval = 0; /* Normal return */
- if (out_creds) {
- *out_creds = credsp;
- credspout = NULL;
- }
+ return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADRESPONSE);
+ /*
+ * We're finished with the initial negotiations; let's get and
+ * send over the authentication header. (The AP_REQ message)
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no credentials were provided, try getting it from the
+ * credentials cache.
+ */
+ memset((char *)&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+
+ /*
+ * See if we need to access the credentials cache
+ */
+ if (!in_creds || !in_creds->ticket.length) {
+ if (ccache)
+ use_ccache = ccache;
+ else if ((retval = krb5int_cc_default(context, &use_ccache)))
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+ if (!in_creds) {
+ if ((retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, server,
+ &creds.server)))
+ goto error_return;
+ if (client)
+ retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, client,
+ &creds.client);
+ else
+ retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, use_ccache,
+ &creds.client);
+ if (retval) {
+ krb5_free_principal(context, creds.server);
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+ /* creds.times.endtime = 0; -- memset 0 takes care of this
+ zero means "as long as possible" */
+ /* creds.keyblock.enctype = 0; -- as well as this.
+ zero means no session enctype
+ preference */
+ in_creds = &creds;
+ }
+ if (!in_creds->ticket.length) {
+ if ((retval = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0,
+ use_ccache, in_creds, &credsp)))
+ goto error_return;
+ credspout = credsp;
+ } else {
+ credsp = in_creds;
+ }
+
+ if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY) {
+ /* Provide some more fodder for random number code.
+ This isn't strong cryptographically; the point here is
+ not to guarantee randomness, but to make it less likely
+ that multiple sessions could pick the same subkey. */
+ char rnd_data[1024];
+ GETPEERNAME_ARG3_TYPE len2;
+ krb5_data d;
+ d.length = sizeof (rnd_data);
+ d.data = rnd_data;
+ len2 = sizeof (rnd_data);
+ if (getpeername (*(int*)fd, (GETPEERNAME_ARG2_TYPE *) rnd_data,
+ &len2) == 0) {
+ d.length = len2;
+ (void) krb5_c_random_add_entropy (context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_EXTERNAL_PROTOCOL, &d);
+ }
+ len2 = sizeof (rnd_data);
+ if (getsockname (*(int*)fd, (GETSOCKNAME_ARG2_TYPE *) rnd_data,
+ &len2) == 0) {
+ d.length = len2;
+ (void) krb5_c_random_add_entropy (context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_EXTERNAL_PROTOCOL, &d);
+ }
+ }
+
+ outbuf[0].data = NULL; /* Coverity is confused otherwise */
+ if ((retval = krb5_mk_req_extended(context, auth_context,
+ ap_req_options, in_data, credsp,
+ &outbuf[0])))
+ goto error_return;
+
+ /*
+ * First write the length of the AP_REQ message, then write
+ * the message itself.
+ */
+ retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf[0]);
+ free(outbuf[0].data);
+ if (retval)
+ goto error_return;
+
+ /*
+ * Now, read back a message. If it was a null message (the
+ * length was zero) then there was no error. If not, we the
+ * authentication was rejected, and we need to return the
+ * error structure.
+ */
+ if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
+ goto error_return;
+
+ if (inbuf.length) {
+ if (error) {
+ if ((retval = krb5_rd_error(context, &inbuf, error))) {
+ free(inbuf.data);
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+ }
+ retval = KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED;
+ free(inbuf.data);
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we asked for mutual authentication, we should now get a
+ * length field, followed by a AP_REP message
+ */
+ if ((ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)) {
+ krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *repl = 0;
+
+ if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
+ goto error_return;
+
+ if ((retval = krb5_rd_rep(context, *auth_context, &inbuf,
+ &repl))) {
+ if (repl)
+ krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
+ free(inbuf.data);
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+ free(inbuf.data);
+ /*
+ * If the user wants to look at the AP_REP message,
+ * copy it for him
+ */
+ if (rep_result)
+ *rep_result = repl;
+ else
+ krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
+ }
+ retval = 0; /* Normal return */
+ if (out_creds) {
+ *out_creds = credsp;
+ credspout = NULL;
+ }
error_return:
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
if (credspout != NULL)
- krb5_free_creds(context, credspout);
+ krb5_free_creds(context, credspout);
if (!ccache && use_ccache)
- krb5_cc_close(context, use_ccache);
+ krb5_cc_close(context, use_ccache);
return(retval);
}
-
-
projects / krb5.git / commitdiff