* sendauth.c (krb_net_rd_sendauth): Arg raw_len now points to KRB4_32; don't

cast it to pointer to unsigned long.  Change ld.so warning message check to be
byte-order independent.
* krb4int.h (krb_net_rd_sendauth): Decl updated.

git-svn-id: svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5/trunk@15124 dc483132-0cff-0310-8789-dd5450dbe970

diff --git a/src/lib/krb4/ChangeLog b/src/lib/krb4/ChangeLog
index 735b4204d214bc9a293d0baa38609f68edca77ca..e43bd590108b1fc55fd485b42582fab13ba83d13 100644 (file)
--- a/src/lib/krb4/ChangeLog
+++ b/src/lib/krb4/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+2003-01-15  Ken Raeburn  <raeburn@mit.edu>
+
+       * sendauth.c (krb_net_rd_sendauth): Arg raw_len now points to
+       KRB4_32; don't cast it to pointer to unsigned long.  Change ld.so
+       warning message check to be byte-order independent.
+       * krb4int.h (krb_net_rd_sendauth): Decl updated.
+
 2003-01-15  Tom Yu  <tlyu@mit.edu>
 
        * CCache-glue.c: New file from KfM.

diff --git a/src/lib/krb4/krb4int.h b/src/lib/krb4/krb4int.h
index 82a66f649f4f522d6a2ed5c572de4f2ed2e912d8..1c7ab9f7912600d079c05f060eed17c3734f69cd 100644 (file)
--- a/src/lib/krb4/krb4int.h
+++ b/src/lib/krb4/krb4int.h
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int krb_rd_preauth(KTEXT, char *, int, Principal *, des_cblock);
 #endif
 
 /* sendauth.c */
-int krb_net_rd_sendauth(int, KTEXT, char *);
+int krb_net_rd_sendauth(int, KTEXT, KRB4_32 *);
 
 /* stime.c */
 char *krb_stime(long *);

diff --git a/src/lib/krb4/sendauth.c b/src/lib/krb4/sendauth.c
index e4c8da7e6d32251c4b67592f7bf9ecf602b8ee3a..d4ae44ef309da5f0526f3610f860e4738ba66a15 100644 (file)
--- a/src/lib/krb4/sendauth.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb4/sendauth.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int
 krb_net_rd_sendauth (fd, reply, raw_len)
      int fd;                   /* file descriptor to write onto */
      KTEXT reply;              /* Where we put the reply message */
-     char *raw_len;            /* Where to read the length field info */
+     KRB4_32 *raw_len;         /* Where to read the length field info */
 {
     KRB4_32 tkt_len;
     int got;
@@ -145,8 +145,7 @@ krb_net_rd_sendauth (fd, reply, raw_len)
        when it starts up.  We just ignore any such message and keep
        going.  This doesn't affect security: we just require the
        ticket to follow the warning message.  */
-    if ((*(unsigned long *)raw_len
-        == (('l' << 24) | ('d' << 16) | ('.' << 8) | 's'))) {
+    if (!memcmp("ld.s", raw_len, 4)) {
        char c;
 
        while (krb_net_read(fd, &c, 1) == 1 && c != '\n')
@@ -154,7 +153,7 @@ krb_net_rd_sendauth (fd, reply, raw_len)
        goto reread;
     }
 
-    tkt_len = ntohl(*(unsigned long *)raw_len);
+    tkt_len = ntohl(*raw_len);
 
     /* if the length is negative, the server failed to recognize us. */
     if ((tkt_len < 0) || (tkt_len > sizeof(reply->dat)))