#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L
/* Use CMS support present in OpenSSL 1.0 and later. */
#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#define pkinit_CMS_get0_content_signed(_cms) CMS_Get0_Content(_cms)
+#define pkinit_CMS_get0_content_data(_cms) CMS_Get0_Content(_cms)
#define pkinit_CMS_free1_crls(_sk_x509crl) sk_X509_CRL_free((_sk_x509crl))
#define pkinit_CMS_free1_certs(_sk_x509) sk_X509_free((_sk_x509))
#define pkinit_CMS_SignerInfo_get_cert(_cms,_si,_x509_pp) \
#define CMS_SignerInfo PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
#define d2i_CMS_ContentInfo d2i_PKCS7
#define CMS_get0_type(_p7) ((_p7)->type)
-#define CMS_get0_content(_p7) (&((_p7)->d.other->value.octet_string))
+#define pkinit_CMS_get0_content_signed(_p7) (&((_p7)->d.sign->contents->d.other->value.octet_string))
+#define pkinit_CMS_get0_content_data(_p7) (&((_p7)->d.other->value.octet_string))
#define CMS_set1_signers_certs(_p7,_stack_of_x509,_uint)
#define CMS_get0_SignerInfos PKCS7_get_signer_info
#define stack_st_CMS_SignerInfo stack_st_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
unsigned int *authz_data_len,
int *is_signed)
{
+ /*
+ * Warning: Since most openssl functions do not set retval, large chunks of
+ * this function assume that retval is always a failure and may go to
+ * cleanup without setting retval explicitly. Make sure retval is not set
+ * to 0 or errors such as signature verification failure may be converted
+ * to success with significant security consequences.
+ */
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
int flags = CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY;
+ int valid_oid = 0;
unsigned int i = 0;
unsigned int vflags = 0, size = 0;
const unsigned char *p = signed_data;
__FUNCTION__, ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
goto cleanup;
}
+ etype = CMS_get0_eContentType(cms);
- /* Handle the case in pkinit anonymous where we get unsigned data. */
+ /*
+ * Prior to 1.10 the MIT client incorrectly omitted the pkinit structure
+ * directly in a CMS ContentInfo rather than using SignedData with no
+ * signers. Handle that case.
+ */
type = CMS_get0_type(cms);
if (is_signed && !OBJ_cmp(type, oid)) {
unsigned char *d;
*is_signed = 0;
- octets = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+ octets = pkinit_CMS_get0_content_data(cms);
if (!octets || ((*octets)->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
/* get the signer's information from the CMS message */
CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, NULL, 0);
- if ((si_sk = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms)) == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
- if ((si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(si_sk, 0)) == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
- pkinit_CMS_SignerInfo_get_cert(cms, si, &x);
- if (x == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
-
- /* create available CRL information (get local CRLs and include CRLs
- * received in the CMS message
- */
- signerRevoked = CMS_get1_crls(cms);
- if (idctx->revoked == NULL)
- revoked = signerRevoked;
- else if (signerRevoked == NULL)
- revoked = idctx->revoked;
- else {
- size = sk_X509_CRL_num(idctx->revoked);
- revoked = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
- for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
- sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(idctx->revoked, i));
- size = sk_X509_CRL_num(signerRevoked);
- for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
- sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(signerRevoked, i));
- }
+ if (((si_sk = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms)) == NULL) ||
+ ((si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(si_sk, 0)) == NULL)) {
+ /* Not actually signed; anonymous case */
+ if (!is_signed)
+ goto cleanup;
+ *is_signed = 0;
+ /* We cannot use CMS_dataInit because there may be no digest */
+ octets = pkinit_CMS_get0_content_signed(cms);
+ if (octets)
+ out = BIO_new_mem_buf((*octets)->data, (*octets)->length);
+ if (out == NULL)
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else {
+ pkinit_CMS_SignerInfo_get_cert(cms, si, &x);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ goto cleanup;
- /* create available intermediate CAs chains (get local intermediateCAs and
- * include the CA chain received in the CMS message
- */
- signerCerts = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
- if (idctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
- intermediateCAs = signerCerts;
- else if (signerCerts == NULL)
- intermediateCAs = idctx->intermediateCAs;
- else {
- size = sk_X509_num(idctx->intermediateCAs);
- intermediateCAs = sk_X509_new_null();
- for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs,
- sk_X509_value(idctx->intermediateCAs, i));
+ /* create available CRL information (get local CRLs and include CRLs
+ * received in the CMS message
+ */
+ signerRevoked = CMS_get1_crls(cms);
+ if (idctx->revoked == NULL)
+ revoked = signerRevoked;
+ else if (signerRevoked == NULL)
+ revoked = idctx->revoked;
+ else {
+ size = sk_X509_CRL_num(idctx->revoked);
+ revoked = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(idctx->revoked, i));
+ size = sk_X509_CRL_num(signerRevoked);
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(signerRevoked, i));
}
- size = sk_X509_num(signerCerts);
- for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs, sk_X509_value(signerCerts, i));
+
+ /* create available intermediate CAs chains (get local intermediateCAs and
+ * include the CA chain received in the CMS message
+ */
+ signerCerts = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
+ if (idctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
+ intermediateCAs = signerCerts;
+ else if (signerCerts == NULL)
+ intermediateCAs = idctx->intermediateCAs;
+ else {
+ size = sk_X509_num(idctx->intermediateCAs);
+ intermediateCAs = sk_X509_new_null();
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs,
+ sk_X509_value(idctx->intermediateCAs, i));
+ }
+ size = sk_X509_num(signerCerts);
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs, sk_X509_value(signerCerts, i));
+ }
}
- }
- /* initialize x509 context with the received certificate and
- * trusted and intermediate CA chains and CRLs
- */
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, x, intermediateCAs))
- goto cleanup;
+ /* initialize x509 context with the received certificate and
+ * trusted and intermediate CA chains and CRLs
+ */
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, x, intermediateCAs))
+ goto cleanup;
- X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&cert_ctx, revoked);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&cert_ctx, revoked);
- /* add trusted CAs certificates for cert verification */
- if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
- X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&cert_ctx, idctx->trustedCAs);
- else {
- pkiDebug("unable to find any trusted CAs\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ /* add trusted CAs certificates for cert verification */
+ if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&cert_ctx, idctx->trustedCAs);
+ else {
+ pkiDebug("unable to find any trusted CAs\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
#ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN
- if (intermediateCAs != NULL) {
- size = sk_X509_num(intermediateCAs);
- pkiDebug("untrusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
- for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
- sk_X509_value(intermediateCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
- pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
+ if (intermediateCAs != NULL) {
+ size = sk_X509_num(intermediateCAs);
+ pkiDebug("untrusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
+ sk_X509_value(intermediateCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
+ }
}
- }
- if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL) {
- size = sk_X509_num(idctx->trustedCAs);
- pkiDebug("trusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
- for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
- sk_X509_value(idctx->trustedCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
- pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
+ if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL) {
+ size = sk_X509_num(idctx->trustedCAs);
+ pkiDebug("trusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
+ sk_X509_value(idctx->trustedCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
+ }
}
- }
- if (revoked != NULL) {
- size = sk_X509_CRL_num(revoked);
- pkiDebug("CRL chain of size %d\n", size);
- for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(revoked, i);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl), buf, sizeof(buf));
- pkiDebug("crls by CA #%d: %s\n", i , buf);
+ if (revoked != NULL) {
+ size = sk_X509_CRL_num(revoked);
+ pkiDebug("CRL chain of size %d\n", size);
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(revoked, i);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pkiDebug("crls by CA #%d: %s\n", i , buf);
+ }
}
- }
#endif
- i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx);
- if (i <= 0) {
- int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&cert_ctx);
+ i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&cert_ctx);
- reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(cert_ctx.current_cert);
- switch(j) {
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
- retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
- retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
- retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE;
- break;
- default:
- retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
- }
- if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL)
- strlcpy(buf, "(none)", sizeof(buf));
- else
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(reqctx->received_cert),
- buf, sizeof(buf));
- pkiDebug("problem with cert DN = %s (error=%d) %s\n", buf, j,
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
- krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
+ reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(cert_ctx.current_cert);
+ switch(j) {
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
+ if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL)
+ strlcpy(buf, "(none)", sizeof(buf));
+ else
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(reqctx->received_cert),
+ buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pkiDebug("problem with cert DN = %s (error=%d) %s\n", buf, j,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
#ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN
- size = sk_X509_num(signerCerts);
- pkiDebug("received cert chain of size %d\n", size);
- for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
- X509 *tmp_cert = sk_X509_value(signerCerts, j);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tmp_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
- pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", j, buf);
- }
+ size = sk_X509_num(signerCerts);
+ pkiDebug("received cert chain of size %d\n", size);
+ for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
+ X509 *tmp_cert = sk_X509_value(signerCerts, j);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tmp_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", j, buf);
+ }
#endif
- } else {
- /* retrieve verified certificate chain */
- if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
- verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&cert_ctx);
- }
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_ctx);
- if (i <= 0)
- goto cleanup;
-
- out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
- flags |= CMS_NOATTR;
- etype = CMS_get0_eContentType(cms);
- if (CMS_verify(cms, NULL, store, NULL, out, flags)) {
- int valid_oid = 0;
-
- if (!OBJ_cmp(etype, oid))
- valid_oid = 1;
- else if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) {
- /*
- * Various implementations of the pa-type 15 request use
- * different OIDS. We check that the returned object
- * has any of the acceptable OIDs
- */
- ASN1_OBJECT *client_oid = NULL, *server_oid = NULL, *rsa_oid = NULL;
- client_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_CLIENT);
- server_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_SERVER);
- rsa_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_ENVEL_SERVER);
- if (!OBJ_cmp(etype, client_oid) ||
- !OBJ_cmp(etype, server_oid) ||
- !OBJ_cmp(etype, rsa_oid))
- valid_oid = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* retrieve verified certificate chain */
+ if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
+ verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&cert_ctx);
}
-
- if (valid_oid)
- pkiDebug("CMS Verification successful\n");
- else {
- pkiDebug("wrong oid in eContentType\n");
- print_buffer(etype->data,
- (unsigned int)etype->length);
- retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_ctx);
+ if (i <= 0)
goto cleanup;
- }
- }
- else {
+ out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
+ flags |= CMS_NOATTR;
+ if (CMS_verify(cms, NULL, store, NULL, out, flags) == 0) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
switch(ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
case PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE:
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
goto cleanup;
}
+ } /* message was signed */
+ if (!OBJ_cmp(etype, oid))
+ valid_oid = 1;
+ else if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) {
+ /*
+ * Various implementations of the pa-type 15 request use
+ * different OIDS. We check that the returned object
+ * has any of the acceptable OIDs
+ */
+ ASN1_OBJECT *client_oid = NULL, *server_oid = NULL, *rsa_oid = NULL;
+ client_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_CLIENT);
+ server_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_SERVER);
+ rsa_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_ENVEL_SERVER);
+ if (!OBJ_cmp(etype, client_oid) ||
+ !OBJ_cmp(etype, server_oid) ||
+ !OBJ_cmp(etype, rsa_oid))
+ valid_oid = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (valid_oid)
+ pkiDebug("CMS Verification successful\n");
+ else {
+ pkiDebug("wrong oid in eContentType\n");
+ print_buffer(etype->data,
+ (unsigned int)etype->length);
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
/* transfer the data from CMS message into return buffer */
for (size = 0;;) {
}
*data_len = size;
- reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(x);
+ if (x) {
+ reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(x);
- /* generate authorization data */
- if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) {
+ /* generate authorization data */
+ if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) {
- if (authz_data == NULL || authz_data_len == NULL)
- goto out;
+ if (authz_data == NULL || authz_data_len == NULL)
+ goto out;
- *authz_data = NULL;
- retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(verified_chain,
- &krb5_verified_chain);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("create_identifiers_from_stack failed\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ *authz_data = NULL;
+ retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(verified_chain,
+ &krb5_verified_chain);
+ if (retval) {
+ pkiDebug("create_identifiers_from_stack failed\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
- retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers((const krb5_external_principal_identifier **)krb5_verified_chain, &authz);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers failed\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers((const krb5_external_principal_identifier **)krb5_verified_chain, &authz);
+ if (retval) {
+ pkiDebug("encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers failed\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
- print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)authz->data, authz->length,
- "/tmp/kdc_ad_initial_verified_cas");
+ print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)authz->data, authz->length,
+ "/tmp/kdc_ad_initial_verified_cas");
#endif
- *authz_data = malloc(authz->length);
- if (*authz_data == NULL) {
- retval = ENOMEM;
- goto cleanup;
+ *authz_data = malloc(authz->length);
+ if (*authz_data == NULL) {
+ retval = ENOMEM;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ memcpy(*authz_data, authz->data, authz->length);
+ *authz_data_len = authz->length;
}
- memcpy(*authz_data, authz->data, authz->length);
- *authz_data_len = authz->length;
}
out:
retval = 0;
projects / krb5.git / commitdiff