------------------------------------------------------------------------
r22175 | tlyu | 2009-04-07 17:22:20 -0400 (Tue, 07 Apr 2009) | 14 lines
Changed paths:
M /trunk/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1buf.c
ticket: 6444
subject: CVE-2009-0847 asn1buf_imbed incorrect length validation
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.7
asn1buf_imbed() can perform pointer arithmetic that causes the "bound"
pointer of the subbuffer to be less than the "next" pointer. This can
lead to malloc() failure or crash.
In asn1buf_imbed(), check the length before doing arithmetic to set
subbuf->bound. In asn1buf_remove_octetstring() and
asn1buf_remove_charstring(), check for invalid buffer pointers before
executing an unsigned length check against a (casted to size_t)
negative number.
ticket: 6444
version_fixed: 1.7
git-svn-id: svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5/branches/krb5-1-7@22249
dc483132-0cff-0310-8789-
dd5450dbe970
asn1_error_code asn1buf_imbed(asn1buf *subbuf, const asn1buf *buf, const unsigned int length, const int indef)
{
+ if (buf->next > buf->bound + 1) return ASN1_OVERRUN;
subbuf->base = subbuf->next = buf->next;
if (!indef) {
+ if (length > (size_t)(buf->bound + 1 - buf->next)) return ASN1_OVERRUN;
subbuf->bound = subbuf->base + length - 1;
- if (subbuf->bound > buf->bound)
- return ASN1_OVERRUN;
} else /* constructed indefinite */
subbuf->bound = buf->bound;
return 0;
{
unsigned int i;
+ if (buf->next > buf->bound + 1) return ASN1_OVERRUN;
if (len > (size_t)(buf->bound + 1 - buf->next)) return ASN1_OVERRUN;
if (len == 0) {
*s = 0;
{
unsigned int i;
+ if (buf->next > buf->bound + 1) return ASN1_OVERRUN;
if (len > (size_t)(buf->bound + 1 - buf->next)) return ASN1_OVERRUN;
if (len == 0) {
*s = 0;