FUDGE_FACTOR is wrong, then badness can happen. Also, if
out_buf.length != nbytes+FUDGE_FACTOR, heap corruption could
happen. We really should be using gss_wrap_size_limit() or
something like that, but doing so would require substantial
amounts of reworking. [krb5-appl/685]
git-svn-id: svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5/trunk@11228
dc483132-0cff-0310-8789-
dd5450dbe970
+Thu Feb 25 23:05:03 1999 Tom Yu <tlyu@mit.edu>
+
+ * secure.c (secure_putbuf): Revert Sam's last change; if
+ FUDGE_FACTOR is wrong, then badness can happen. Also, if
+ out_buf.length != nbytes+FUDGE_FACTOR, heap corruption could
+ happen. We really should be using gss_wrap_size_limit() or
+ something like that, but doing so would require substantial
+ amounts of reworking. [krb5-appl/685]
+
1998-11-13 Theodore Ts'o <tytso@rsts-11.mit.edu>
* Makefile.in: Set the myfulldir and mydir variables (which are
if (outbuf?
(outbuf = realloc(outbuf, (unsigned) out_buf.length)):
(outbuf = malloc((unsigned) out_buf.length))) {
- bufsize = nbyte + FUDGE_FACTOR;
+ bufsize = out_buf.length;
} else {
bufsize = 0;
secure_error("%s (in malloc of PROT buffer)",