Return-Path: X-Original-To: notmuch@notmuchmail.org Delivered-To: notmuch@notmuchmail.org Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by olra.theworths.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F3F21431FB6 for ; Sat, 5 Apr 2014 12:09:45 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at olra.theworths.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.525 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.525 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, URIBL_BLACK=1.775] autolearn=disabled Received: from olra.theworths.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (olra.theworths.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id syYfQM4BJGfF for ; Sat, 5 Apr 2014 12:09:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from outgoing-mail.its.caltech.edu (outgoing-mail.its.caltech.edu [131.215.239.19]) by olra.theworths.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62DC6431FAF for ; Sat, 5 Apr 2014 12:09:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fire-doxen.imss.caltech.edu (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by fire-doxen-postvirus (Postfix) with ESMTP id B813532820C; Sat, 5 Apr 2014 12:09:36 -0700 (PDT) X-Spam-Scanned: at Caltech-IMSS on fire-doxen by amavisd-new Received: from finestructure.net (cpe-107-185-189-81.socal.res.rr.com [107.185.189.81]) (Authenticated sender: jrollins) by fire-doxen-submit (Postfix) with ESMTP id 464F63280C3; Sat, 5 Apr 2014 12:09:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: by finestructure.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id C095260124; Sat, 5 Apr 2014 12:09:34 -0700 (PDT) From: Jameson Graef Rollins To: David Bremner , john.wyzer@gmx.de, notmuch@notmuchmail.org Subject: Re: Feature suggestion. Indexing encrypted mail? In-Reply-To: <878urj1z3j.fsf@maritornes.cs.unb.ca> References: <86k3b3ybo6.fsf@someserver.somewhere> <878urj1z3j.fsf@maritornes.cs.unb.ca> User-Agent: Notmuch/0.17+174~gaa1f476 (http://notmuchmail.org) Emacs/24.3.1 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Date: Sat, 05 Apr 2014 12:09:32 -0700 Message-ID: <87txa7pp8z.fsf@servo.finestructure.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature" Cc: Daniel Kahn Gillmor X-BeenThere: notmuch@notmuchmail.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.13 Precedence: list List-Id: "Use and development of the notmuch mail system." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 05 Apr 2014 19:09:46 -0000 --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Sat, Apr 05 2014, David Bremner wrote: > john.wyzer@gmx.de writes: > >> Would it be possible to add the configurable option to also decrypt >> encrypted messages on the fly while indexing to make them searchable, >> too? >> >> That would be really great for people that consider gnupg mainly an >> encryption for transport or have their complete hard drive encrypted... > > As far I understand an attacker could reconstruct the message from the > index, so one question is whether the extra complexity in notmuch is > worth the minimal extra security over decrypting on delivery and storing > plaintext on the (presumably encrypted) disk. Of course decrypting on > delivery may be inconvenient (or impossible). I have CCed the two people > who have implemented most of the crypto related stuff in notmuch so they > can comment. Indexing encrypted email is a bit of a foot-gun, since, as David mentions, it is apparently possible to reconstruct encrypted messages From=20the index. It therefore needs to be approached with care. I think decrypting on "delivery" (or mail fetch or whatever) sounds difficult and unwieldy. In either event, it seems out of the scope of notmuch. If a user figured out how to have that done, no changes to notmuch would be needed afaict. =20 I don't think it would be difficult modify notmuch new to decrypt at indexing time. Given that gnupg agent would be used for accessing the users private key for decryption, the interface would be fairly straightforward. A couple of decryption options could be added to notmuch new: * don't decrypt: don't attempt to decrypt and index any encrypted message (default) * decrypt always: fail if any encrypted message could not be decrypted * decrypt opportunistically: attempt to decrypt, but continue indexing if an encrypted message could not be decrypted If something like this is enabled, we should make sure we make the dangers clear to the users. jamie. --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJTQFTsAAoJEO00zqvie6q83QkQAJ17ZJ60k5CrPZotnd/hx5L/ /Qe4ovlLCKECK+P10bK7YmlH350ujnX5YsgO00QEbvaS09nTDofRpvE9zZiWvlPr MTdqnJ5p9iz6+LsELRerDEMMxEgLtUgSD/tNVCZWJJ5sUC3TwznJMCLLdkYmwRRe EflzG0ASIb4ooL6oeyDcsbtir2A11232bPd+AL+WZFzfXXvBEBvbqGX8fwujZ6IY 95xd3bT9IpVgk8TbKdY5Smor6K5nZfmm5TM2/O8fjt4bwKUJAhj2OCkUbEgpw+RP VeYV9+2B5iEAYQFKNEDdLr1vumln2p30WcnvJpEFwzE6nwtRzbW0VZ2BfJsl40qn FpXYOyudOhh3cwDgXDcv1ubvILuys+nu5vWsx2xdn8Lg7EDYIsA33NHr1rH9Laj0 kliU4ySLdwOrHUKvr63aVXMt+FwhfBWdR6CtQa+m5nZIR6tUC8MxyU4ROxtK37EA 7s15rIqce/dvyyskKv57a0V79bTARICPR8xERIwANcSlVv8LH9iAC1R23UoSaT8J 7XEKicuMcsQawkDcIJYEYu+FUOtfb8DqRrMZ5WaWYYu9FRuYEG5Uuq9otu49IIEG ePkDUreFfEBs0Pu/1PU8r+sjmK41pcuHhd7SuqzrCzpwf9+v6q7kHMsZywhrRfbk MtNEBcRJujCfQZ/QZIzv =4Tws -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=--