k5_plugin_register(kcontext, PLUGIN_INTERFACE_CLPREAUTH,
"encrypted_timestamp",
clpreauth_encrypted_timestamp_initvt);
+ k5_plugin_register(kcontext, PLUGIN_INTERFACE_CLPREAUTH, "sam2",
+ clpreauth_sam2_initvt);
/* Get all available clpreauth vtables. */
if (k5_plugin_load_all(kcontext, PLUGIN_INTERFACE_CLPREAUTH, &plugins))
return 0;
}
-/* this macro expands to the int,ptr necessary for "%.*s" in an sprintf */
-
-#define SAMDATA(kdata, str, maxsize) \
- (int)((kdata.length)? \
- ((((kdata.length)<=(maxsize))?(kdata.length):strlen(str))): \
- strlen(str)), \
- (kdata.length)? \
- ((((kdata.length)<=(maxsize))?(kdata.data):(str))):(str)
-static char *
-sam_challenge_banner(krb5_int32 sam_type)
-{
- char *label;
-
- switch (sam_type) {
- case PA_SAM_TYPE_ENIGMA: /* Enigma Logic */
- label = _("Challenge for Enigma Logic mechanism");
- break;
- case PA_SAM_TYPE_DIGI_PATH: /* Digital Pathways */
- case PA_SAM_TYPE_DIGI_PATH_HEX: /* Digital Pathways */
- label = _("Challenge for Digital Pathways mechanism");
- break;
- case PA_SAM_TYPE_ACTIVCARD_DEC: /* Digital Pathways */
- case PA_SAM_TYPE_ACTIVCARD_HEX: /* Digital Pathways */
- label = _("Challenge for Activcard mechanism");
- break;
- case PA_SAM_TYPE_SKEY_K0: /* S/key where KDC has key 0 */
- label = _("Challenge for Enhanced S/Key mechanism");
- break;
- case PA_SAM_TYPE_SKEY: /* Traditional S/Key */
- label = _("Challenge for Traditional S/Key mechanism");
- break;
- case PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID: /* Security Dynamics */
- label = _("Challenge for Security Dynamics mechanism");
- break;
- case PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID_PREDICT: /* predictive Security Dynamics */
- label = _("Challenge for Security Dynamics mechanism");
- break;
- default:
- label = _("Challenge from authentication server");
- break;
- }
-
- return(label);
-}
-
-static krb5_error_code
-pa_sam_2(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_pa_data *in_padata,
- krb5_pa_data **out_padata, krb5_data *salt, krb5_data *s2kparams,
- krb5_enctype *etype, krb5_keyblock *as_key,
- krb5_prompter_fct prompter, void *prompter_data,
- krb5_gic_get_as_key_fct gak_fct, void *gak_data)
-{
- krb5_error_code retval;
- krb5_sam_challenge_2 *sc2 = NULL;
- krb5_sam_challenge_2_body *sc2b = NULL;
- krb5_data tmp_data;
- krb5_data response_data;
- char name[100], banner[100], prompt[100], response[100];
- krb5_prompt kprompt;
- krb5_prompt_type prompt_type;
- krb5_data defsalt;
- krb5_checksum **cksum;
- krb5_data *scratch = NULL;
- krb5_boolean valid_cksum = 0;
- krb5_enc_sam_response_enc_2 enc_sam_response_enc_2;
- krb5_sam_response_2 sr2;
- size_t ciph_len;
- krb5_pa_data *sam_padata;
-
- if (prompter == NULL)
- return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
-
- tmp_data.length = in_padata->length;
- tmp_data.data = (char *)in_padata->contents;
-
- if ((retval = decode_krb5_sam_challenge_2(&tmp_data, &sc2)))
- return(retval);
-
- retval = decode_krb5_sam_challenge_2_body(&sc2->sam_challenge_2_body, &sc2b);
-
- if (retval) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- return(retval);
- }
-
- if (!sc2->sam_cksum || ! *sc2->sam_cksum) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- return(KRB5_SAM_NO_CHECKSUM);
- }
-
- if (sc2b->sam_flags & KRB5_SAM_MUST_PK_ENCRYPT_SAD) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- return(KRB5_SAM_UNSUPPORTED);
- }
-
- if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(sc2b->sam_etype)) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- return(KRB5_SAM_INVALID_ETYPE);
- }
-
- /* All of the above error checks are KDC-specific, that is, they */
- /* assume a failure in the KDC reply. By returning anything other */
- /* than KRB5_KDC_UNREACH, KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED, */
- /* KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR, or KRB5_REALM_CANT_RESOLVE, the client will */
- /* most likely go on to try the AS_REQ against master KDC */
-
- if (!(sc2b->sam_flags & KRB5_SAM_USE_SAD_AS_KEY)) {
- /* We will need the password to obtain the key used for */
- /* the checksum, and encryption of the sam_response. */
- /* Go ahead and get it now, preserving the ordering of */
- /* prompts for the user. */
-
- retval = (gak_fct)(context, request->client,
- sc2b->sam_etype, prompter,
- prompter_data, salt, s2kparams, as_key, gak_data);
- if (retval) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- return(retval);
- }
- }
-
- snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s",
- SAMDATA(sc2b->sam_type_name, _("SAM Authentication"),
- sizeof(name) - 1));
-
- snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner), "%.*s",
- SAMDATA(sc2b->sam_challenge_label,
- sam_challenge_banner(sc2b->sam_type),
- sizeof(banner)-1));
-
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%s%.*s%s%.*s",
- sc2b->sam_challenge.length?"Challenge is [":"",
- SAMDATA(sc2b->sam_challenge, "", 20),
- sc2b->sam_challenge.length?"], ":"",
- SAMDATA(sc2b->sam_response_prompt, "passcode", 55));
-
- response_data.data = response;
- response_data.length = sizeof(response);
- kprompt.prompt = prompt;
- kprompt.hidden = 1;
- kprompt.reply = &response_data;
-
- prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH;
- krb5int_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type);
-
- if ((retval = ((*prompter)(context, prompter_data, name,
- banner, 1, &kprompt)))) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- krb5int_set_prompt_types(context, 0);
- return(retval);
- }
-
- krb5int_set_prompt_types(context, (krb5_prompt_type *)NULL);
-
- /* Generate salt used by string_to_key() */
- if (((int) salt->length == -1) && (salt->data == NULL)) {
- if ((retval =
- krb5_principal2salt(context, request->client, &defsalt))) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- return(retval);
- }
- salt = &defsalt;
- } else {
- defsalt.length = 0;
- }
-
- /* Get encryption key to be used for checksum and sam_response */
- if (!(sc2b->sam_flags & KRB5_SAM_USE_SAD_AS_KEY)) {
- /* as_key = string_to_key(password) */
-
- if (as_key->length) {
- krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, as_key);
- as_key->length = 0;
- }
-
- /* generate a key using the supplied password */
- retval = krb5_c_string_to_key(context, sc2b->sam_etype,
- (krb5_data *)gak_data, salt, as_key);
-
- if (retval) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- if (defsalt.length) free(defsalt.data);
- return(retval);
- }
-
- if (!(sc2b->sam_flags & KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD)) {
- /* as_key = combine_key (as_key, string_to_key(SAD)) */
- krb5_keyblock tmp_kb;
-
- retval = krb5_c_string_to_key(context, sc2b->sam_etype,
- &response_data, salt, &tmp_kb);
-
- if (retval) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- if (defsalt.length) free(defsalt.data);
- return(retval);
- }
-
- /* This should be a call to the crypto library some day */
- /* key types should already match the sam_etype */
- retval = krb5int_c_combine_keys(context, as_key, &tmp_kb, as_key);
-
- if (retval) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- if (defsalt.length) free(defsalt.data);
- return(retval);
- }
- krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &tmp_kb);
- }
-
- if (defsalt.length)
- free(defsalt.data);
-
- } else {
- /* as_key = string_to_key(SAD) */
-
- if (as_key->length) {
- krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, as_key);
- as_key->length = 0;
- }
-
- /* generate a key using the supplied password */
- retval = krb5_c_string_to_key(context, sc2b->sam_etype,
- &response_data, salt, as_key);
-
- if (defsalt.length)
- free(defsalt.data);
-
- if (retval) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- return(retval);
- }
- }
-
- /* Now we have a key, verify the checksum on the sam_challenge */
-
- cksum = sc2->sam_cksum;
-
- for (; *cksum; cksum++) {
- if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum((*cksum)->checksum_type))
- continue;
- /* Check this cksum */
- retval = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context, as_key,
- KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_CHALLENGE_CKSUM,
- &sc2->sam_challenge_2_body,
- *cksum, &valid_cksum);
- if (retval) {
- krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- return(retval);
- }
- if (valid_cksum)
- break;
- }
-
- if (!valid_cksum) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- /*
- * Note: We return AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY so upper-level applications
- * can interpret that as "password incorrect", which is probably
- * the best error we can return in this situation.
- */
- return(KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
- }
-
- /* fill in enc_sam_response_enc_2 */
- enc_sam_response_enc_2.magic = KV5M_ENC_SAM_RESPONSE_ENC_2;
- enc_sam_response_enc_2.sam_nonce = sc2b->sam_nonce;
- if (sc2b->sam_flags & KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD) {
- enc_sam_response_enc_2.sam_sad = response_data;
- } else {
- enc_sam_response_enc_2.sam_sad.data = NULL;
- enc_sam_response_enc_2.sam_sad.length = 0;
- }
-
- /* encode and encrypt enc_sam_response_enc_2 with as_key */
- retval = encode_krb5_enc_sam_response_enc_2(&enc_sam_response_enc_2,
- &scratch);
- if (retval) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- return(retval);
- }
-
- /* Fill in sam_response_2 */
- memset(&sr2, 0, sizeof(sr2));
- sr2.sam_type = sc2b->sam_type;
- sr2.sam_flags = sc2b->sam_flags;
- sr2.sam_track_id = sc2b->sam_track_id;
- sr2.sam_nonce = sc2b->sam_nonce;
-
- /* Now take care of sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad by encrypting encoded */
- /* enc_sam_response_enc_2 from above */
-
- retval = krb5_c_encrypt_length(context, as_key->enctype, scratch->length,
- &ciph_len);
- if (retval) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
- return(retval);
- }
- sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.length = ciph_len;
-
- sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.data =
- (char *)malloc(sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.length);
-
- if (!sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.data) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
- return(ENOMEM);
- }
-
- retval = krb5_c_encrypt(context, as_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_RESPONSE,
- NULL, scratch, &sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad);
- if (retval) {
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
- krb5_free_data_contents(context, &sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext);
- return(retval);
- }
- krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
- scratch = NULL;
-
- /* Encode the sam_response_2 */
- retval = encode_krb5_sam_response_2(&sr2, &scratch);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
- krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
- krb5_free_data_contents(context, &sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext);
-
- if (retval) {
- return (retval);
- }
-
- /* Almost there, just need to make padata ! */
- sam_padata = malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
- if (sam_padata == NULL) {
- krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
- return(ENOMEM);
- }
-
- sam_padata->magic = KV5M_PA_DATA;
- sam_padata->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_SAM_RESPONSE_2;
- sam_padata->length = scratch->length;
- sam_padata->contents = (krb5_octet *) scratch->data;
- free(scratch);
-
- *out_padata = sam_padata;
-
- return(0);
-}
-
static krb5_error_code
pa_s4u_x509_user(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_pa_data *in_padata, krb5_pa_data **out_padata,
pa_salt,
PA_INFO,
},
- {
- KRB5_PADATA_SAM_CHALLENGE_2,
- pa_sam_2,
- PA_REAL,
- },
{
KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE,
pa_fx_cookie,
--- /dev/null
+/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
+/* lib/krb5/krb/preauth_sam2.c - SAM-2 clpreauth module */
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995, 2003, 2008, 2012 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All
+ * Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may
+ * require a specific license from the United States Government.
+ * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
+ * export to obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label
+ * your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a
+ * fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software.
+ * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <k5-int.h>
+#include <krb5/preauth_plugin.h>
+#include "int-proto.h"
+
+static int
+sam2_flags(krb5_context context, krb5_preauthtype pa_type)
+{
+ return PA_REAL;
+}
+
+/* this macro expands to the int,ptr necessary for "%.*s" in an sprintf */
+
+#define SAMDATA(kdata, str, maxsize) \
+ (int)((kdata.length)? \
+ ((((kdata.length)<=(maxsize))?(kdata.length):strlen(str))): \
+ strlen(str)), \
+ (kdata.length)? \
+ ((((kdata.length)<=(maxsize))?(kdata.data):(str))):(str)
+static char *
+sam_challenge_banner(krb5_int32 sam_type)
+{
+ char *label;
+
+ switch (sam_type) {
+ case PA_SAM_TYPE_ENIGMA: /* Enigma Logic */
+ label = _("Challenge for Enigma Logic mechanism");
+ break;
+ case PA_SAM_TYPE_DIGI_PATH: /* Digital Pathways */
+ case PA_SAM_TYPE_DIGI_PATH_HEX: /* Digital Pathways */
+ label = _("Challenge for Digital Pathways mechanism");
+ break;
+ case PA_SAM_TYPE_ACTIVCARD_DEC: /* Digital Pathways */
+ case PA_SAM_TYPE_ACTIVCARD_HEX: /* Digital Pathways */
+ label = _("Challenge for Activcard mechanism");
+ break;
+ case PA_SAM_TYPE_SKEY_K0: /* S/key where KDC has key 0 */
+ label = _("Challenge for Enhanced S/Key mechanism");
+ break;
+ case PA_SAM_TYPE_SKEY: /* Traditional S/Key */
+ label = _("Challenge for Traditional S/Key mechanism");
+ break;
+ case PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID: /* Security Dynamics */
+ label = _("Challenge for Security Dynamics mechanism");
+ break;
+ case PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID_PREDICT: /* predictive Security Dynamics */
+ label = _("Challenge for Security Dynamics mechanism");
+ break;
+ default:
+ label = _("Challenge from authentication server");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return(label);
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+sam2_process(krb5_context context, krb5_clpreauth_moddata moddata,
+ krb5_clpreauth_modreq modreq, krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
+ krb5_clpreauth_callbacks cb, krb5_clpreauth_rock rock,
+ krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *encoded_request_body,
+ krb5_data *encoded_previous_request, krb5_pa_data *padata,
+ krb5_prompter_fct prompter, void *prompter_data,
+ krb5_pa_data ***out_padata)
+{
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+ krb5_sam_challenge_2 *sc2 = NULL;
+ krb5_sam_challenge_2_body *sc2b = NULL;
+ krb5_data tmp_data;
+ krb5_data response_data;
+ char name[100], banner[100], prompt[100], response[100];
+ krb5_prompt kprompt;
+ krb5_prompt_type prompt_type;
+ krb5_data defsalt, *salt;
+ krb5_checksum **cksum;
+ krb5_data *scratch = NULL;
+ krb5_boolean valid_cksum = 0;
+ krb5_enc_sam_response_enc_2 enc_sam_response_enc_2;
+ krb5_sam_response_2 sr2;
+ size_t ciph_len;
+ krb5_pa_data **sam_padata;
+
+ if (prompter == NULL)
+ return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
+
+ tmp_data.length = padata->length;
+ tmp_data.data = (char *)padata->contents;
+
+ if ((retval = decode_krb5_sam_challenge_2(&tmp_data, &sc2)))
+ return(retval);
+
+ retval = decode_krb5_sam_challenge_2_body(&sc2->sam_challenge_2_body, &sc2b);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+
+ if (!sc2->sam_cksum || ! *sc2->sam_cksum) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ return(KRB5_SAM_NO_CHECKSUM);
+ }
+
+ if (sc2b->sam_flags & KRB5_SAM_MUST_PK_ENCRYPT_SAD) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ return(KRB5_SAM_UNSUPPORTED);
+ }
+
+ if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(sc2b->sam_etype)) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ return(KRB5_SAM_INVALID_ETYPE);
+ }
+
+ /* All of the above error checks are KDC-specific, that is, they */
+ /* assume a failure in the KDC reply. By returning anything other */
+ /* than KRB5_KDC_UNREACH, KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED, */
+ /* KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR, or KRB5_REALM_CANT_RESOLVE, the client will */
+ /* most likely go on to try the AS_REQ against master KDC */
+
+ if (!(sc2b->sam_flags & KRB5_SAM_USE_SAD_AS_KEY)) {
+ /* We will need the password to obtain the key used for */
+ /* the checksum, and encryption of the sam_response. */
+ /* Go ahead and get it now, preserving the ordering of */
+ /* prompts for the user. */
+
+ retval = (*rock->gak_fct)(context, request->client, sc2b->sam_etype,
+ prompter, prompter_data, rock->salt,
+ rock->s2kparams, rock->as_key,
+ *rock->gak_data);
+ if (retval) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+ }
+
+ snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s",
+ SAMDATA(sc2b->sam_type_name, _("SAM Authentication"),
+ sizeof(name) - 1));
+
+ snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner), "%.*s",
+ SAMDATA(sc2b->sam_challenge_label,
+ sam_challenge_banner(sc2b->sam_type),
+ sizeof(banner)-1));
+
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%s%.*s%s%.*s",
+ sc2b->sam_challenge.length?"Challenge is [":"",
+ SAMDATA(sc2b->sam_challenge, "", 20),
+ sc2b->sam_challenge.length?"], ":"",
+ SAMDATA(sc2b->sam_response_prompt, "passcode", 55));
+
+ response_data.data = response;
+ response_data.length = sizeof(response);
+ kprompt.prompt = prompt;
+ kprompt.hidden = 1;
+ kprompt.reply = &response_data;
+
+ prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH;
+ krb5int_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type);
+
+ if ((retval = ((*prompter)(context, prompter_data, name,
+ banner, 1, &kprompt)))) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ krb5int_set_prompt_types(context, 0);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+
+ krb5int_set_prompt_types(context, (krb5_prompt_type *)NULL);
+
+ /* Generate salt used by string_to_key() */
+ salt = rock->salt;
+ if (((int) salt->length == -1) && (salt->data == NULL)) {
+ if ((retval =
+ krb5_principal2salt(context, request->client, &defsalt))) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+ salt = &defsalt;
+ } else {
+ defsalt.length = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Get encryption key to be used for checksum and sam_response */
+ if (!(sc2b->sam_flags & KRB5_SAM_USE_SAD_AS_KEY)) {
+ /* as_key = string_to_key(password) */
+
+ if (rock->as_key->length) {
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, rock->as_key);
+ rock->as_key->length = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* generate a key using the supplied password */
+ retval = krb5_c_string_to_key(context, sc2b->sam_etype,
+ (krb5_data *)*rock->gak_data, salt,
+ rock->as_key);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ if (defsalt.length) free(defsalt.data);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+
+ if (!(sc2b->sam_flags & KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD)) {
+ /* as_key = combine_key (as_key, string_to_key(SAD)) */
+ krb5_keyblock tmp_kb;
+
+ retval = krb5_c_string_to_key(context, sc2b->sam_etype,
+ &response_data, salt, &tmp_kb);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ if (defsalt.length) free(defsalt.data);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+
+ /* This should be a call to the crypto library some day */
+ /* key types should already match the sam_etype */
+ retval = krb5int_c_combine_keys(context, rock->as_key, &tmp_kb,
+ rock->as_key);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ if (defsalt.length) free(defsalt.data);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &tmp_kb);
+ }
+
+ if (defsalt.length)
+ free(defsalt.data);
+
+ } else {
+ /* as_key = string_to_key(SAD) */
+
+ if (rock->as_key->length) {
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, rock->as_key);
+ rock->as_key->length = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* generate a key using the supplied password */
+ retval = krb5_c_string_to_key(context, sc2b->sam_etype,
+ &response_data, salt, rock->as_key);
+
+ if (defsalt.length)
+ free(defsalt.data);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now we have a key, verify the checksum on the sam_challenge */
+
+ cksum = sc2->sam_cksum;
+
+ for (; *cksum; cksum++) {
+ if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum((*cksum)->checksum_type))
+ continue;
+ /* Check this cksum */
+ retval = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context, rock->as_key,
+ KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_CHALLENGE_CKSUM,
+ &sc2->sam_challenge_2_body,
+ *cksum, &valid_cksum);
+ if (retval) {
+ krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+ if (valid_cksum)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!valid_cksum) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ /*
+ * Note: We return AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY so upper-level applications
+ * can interpret that as "password incorrect", which is probably
+ * the best error we can return in this situation.
+ */
+ return(KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
+ }
+
+ /* fill in enc_sam_response_enc_2 */
+ enc_sam_response_enc_2.magic = KV5M_ENC_SAM_RESPONSE_ENC_2;
+ enc_sam_response_enc_2.sam_nonce = sc2b->sam_nonce;
+ if (sc2b->sam_flags & KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD) {
+ enc_sam_response_enc_2.sam_sad = response_data;
+ } else {
+ enc_sam_response_enc_2.sam_sad.data = NULL;
+ enc_sam_response_enc_2.sam_sad.length = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* encode and encrypt enc_sam_response_enc_2 with as_key */
+ retval = encode_krb5_enc_sam_response_enc_2(&enc_sam_response_enc_2,
+ &scratch);
+ if (retval) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+
+ /* Fill in sam_response_2 */
+ memset(&sr2, 0, sizeof(sr2));
+ sr2.sam_type = sc2b->sam_type;
+ sr2.sam_flags = sc2b->sam_flags;
+ sr2.sam_track_id = sc2b->sam_track_id;
+ sr2.sam_nonce = sc2b->sam_nonce;
+
+ /* Now take care of sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad by encrypting encoded */
+ /* enc_sam_response_enc_2 from above */
+
+ retval = krb5_c_encrypt_length(context, rock->as_key->enctype,
+ scratch->length, &ciph_len);
+ if (retval) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+ sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.length = ciph_len;
+
+ sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.data =
+ (char *)malloc(sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.length);
+
+ if (!sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.data) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
+ return(ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+ retval = krb5_c_encrypt(context, rock->as_key,
+ KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_RESPONSE, NULL, scratch,
+ &sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad);
+ if (retval) {
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
+ krb5_free_data_contents(context, &sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext);
+ return(retval);
+ }
+ krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
+ scratch = NULL;
+
+ /* Encode the sam_response_2 */
+ retval = encode_krb5_sam_response_2(&sr2, &scratch);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2_body(context, sc2b);
+ krb5_free_data_contents(context, &sr2.sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ return (retval);
+ }
+
+ /* Almost there, just need to make padata ! */
+ sam_padata = malloc(2 * sizeof(*sam_padata));
+ if (sam_padata == NULL) {
+ krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
+ return(ENOMEM);
+ }
+ sam_padata[0] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
+ if (sam_padata[0] == NULL) {
+ krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
+ free(sam_padata);
+ return(ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+ sam_padata[0]->magic = KV5M_PA_DATA;
+ sam_padata[0]->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_SAM_RESPONSE_2;
+ sam_padata[0]->length = scratch->length;
+ sam_padata[0]->contents = (krb5_octet *) scratch->data;
+ free(scratch);
+ sam_padata[1] = NULL;
+
+ *out_padata = sam_padata;
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static krb5_preauthtype sam2_pa_types[] = {
+ KRB5_PADATA_SAM_CHALLENGE_2, 0};
+
+krb5_error_code
+clpreauth_sam2_initvt(krb5_context context, int maj_ver, int min_ver,
+ krb5_plugin_vtable vtable)
+{
+ krb5_clpreauth_vtable vt;
+
+ if (maj_ver != 1)
+ return KRB5_PLUGIN_VER_NOTSUPP;
+ vt = (krb5_clpreauth_vtable)vtable;
+ vt->name = "sam2";
+ vt->pa_type_list = sam2_pa_types;
+ vt->flags = sam2_flags;
+ vt->process = sam2_process;
+ return 0;
+}
projects / krb5.git / commitdiff