Undo some damage from an overambitious patch.

[irker.git] / security.txt

diff --git a/security.txt b/security.txt
index 3807a19b245dc9f25c3e9953c8cca719e195eb1f..8faf43faf4565891c339c0fa5badd7ec7a0359be 100644 (file)
--- a/security.txt
+++ b/security.txt
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ ineffective - just sets a target for the DoS attack.
 
 3. Limit the number of requests that can be queued by source IP address.
 This might be worth doing; it would stymie a single-source DoS attack through
-a publicly-exposed irkerd, though not a DDoS by a bitnet.  But there isn't
+a publicly-exposed irkerd, though not a DDoS by a botnet.  But there isn't
 a lot of win here for a properly installed irker (e.g. behind a firewall), 
 which is typically going to get all its requests from a single repo host
 anyway.
@@ -163,10 +163,6 @@ near resource limits.  An ordinary DoS attack would then be prevented
 from completely blocking all message traffic; the cost would be a
 whole lot of join/leave spam due to connection churn.
 
-We also use greenlets (Python coroutines imitating system threads)
-when they are available.  This reduces memory overhead due to
-threading substantially, making a thread-flooding DoS more dfficult.
-
 == Authentication/Integrity ==
 
 One way to help prevent DoS attacks would be in-band authentication -