From efcd3423362113d69f2baf003d8a508ad8ad85fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ezra Peisach Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2001 18:19:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] * draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt: Describes protocol in use by krb5_change_password(). * README: Describes which admin protocol is used with which server. There is a newer draft of the password changing protocol out (version 2 of the protocol) but we do not implement it. git-svn-id: svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5/trunk@13498 dc483132-0cff-0310-8789-dd5450dbe970 --- doc/kadmin/ChangeLog | 7 + doc/kadmin/README | 46 +++ .../draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt | 311 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 364 insertions(+) create mode 100644 doc/kadmin/README create mode 100644 doc/kadmin/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt diff --git a/doc/kadmin/ChangeLog b/doc/kadmin/ChangeLog index 9916c1a63..5599867c9 100644 --- a/doc/kadmin/ChangeLog +++ b/doc/kadmin/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +2001-06-22 Ezra Peisach + + * draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt: Describes protocol in + use by krb5_change_password(). + + * README: Describes which admin protocol is used with which server. + Thu Sep 7 15:51:56 1995 Theodore Y. Ts'o * kpasswd.protocol: Added official IANA port assignment. (We've diff --git a/doc/kadmin/README b/doc/kadmin/README new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b3e53bfc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/kadmin/README @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +There are several different admin protocols in our source tree. + +a) V4 server protocol - not documented + +b) Old kadmin protocol - which was in the beta code (kadmin/v5passwdd) + +c) Newer kadm5 gssrpc based code (kadmin/server) + +d) Simple password changing protocol implemented in our kadmin server +with client in clients/kpasswd. + + + +This file will attempt to link the files in this directory with where +the code is used in the source tree. + + +- kpasswd.protocol: Describes the password changing protocol in + src/kadmin/v5passwdd. + include/krb5/adm.h has some defintions. + + Client and server provided + +- kadmin.protocol: Describes other administrative protocol options that + src/kadmin/v5passwdd supports + + No client in the source tree uses it. + +- draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt: Describes the + password changing service that + clients/kpasswd uses through krb5_change_password() + located in lib/krb5/os/changepw.c + + kadmin/server/schpw.c implements this as part of + the kadmin server. + + This is version 1 of the protocol. Version 2 is + in the IETF draft stage and is very different. + + Currently: Version 1 is supported - but we may not + be implementing the TCP handling aspects. + +- ../doc/kadm5: Describes the current protocol. + + kadmin/passwd (which is not installed) uses + the kadm5 protocol for password changing. diff --git a/doc/kadmin/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt b/doc/kadmin/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e235bec58 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/kadmin/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ + + + + +Network Working Group M. Horowitz + Stonecast, Inc. +Internet-Draft August, 1998 + + Kerberos Change Password Protocol + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the + ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net + (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific + Rim). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + + The Kerberos V5 protocol [RFC1510] does not describe any mechanism + for users to change their own passwords. In order to promote + interoperability between workstations, personal computers, terminal + servers, routers, and KDC's from multiple vendors, a common password + changing protocol is required. + + + +Overview + + When a user wishes to change his own password, or is required to by + local policy, a simple request of a password changing service is + necessary. This service must be implemented on at least one host for + each Kerberos realm, probably on one of the kdc's for that realm. + The service must accept requests on UDP port 464 (kpasswd), and may + accept requests on TCP port 464 as well. + + The protocol itself consists of a single request message followed by + a single reply message. For UDP transport, each message must be + fully contained in a single UDP packet. + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + +Request Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REQ length | AP-REQ data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + message length (16 bits) + Contains the length of the message, including this field, in bytes + (big-endian integer) + protocol version number (16 bits) + Contains the hex constant 0x0001 (big-endian integer) + AP-REQ length (16 bits) + length (big-endian integer) of AP-REQ data, in bytes. + AP-REQ data, as described in RFC1510 (variable length) + This AP-REQ must be for the service principal + kadmin/changepw@REALM, where REALM is the REALM of the user who + wishes to change his password. The Ticket in the AP-REQ must be + derived from an AS request (thus having the INITIAL flag set), and + must include a subkey in the Authenticator. + KRB-PRIV message, as described in RFC1510 (variable length) + This KRB-PRIV message must be generated using the subkey in the + Authenticator in the AP-REQ data. The user-data component of the + message must consist of the user's new password. + + The server must verify the AP-REQ message, decrypt the new password, + perform any local policy checks (such as password quality, history, + authorization, etc.) required, then set the password to the new value + specified. + + The principal whose password is to be changed is the principal which + authenticated to the password changing service. This protocol does + not address administrators who want to change passwords of principal + besides their own. + + +Reply Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REP length | AP-REP data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV or KRB-ERROR message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + message length (16 bits) + + + +Horowitz [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + + Contains the length of the message, including this field, in bytes + (big-endian integer), + protocol version number (16 bits) + Contains the hex constant 0x0001 (big-endian integer) + AP-REP length (16 bits) + length of AP-REP data, in bytes. If the the length is zero, then + the last field will contain a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB- + PRIV message. + AP-REP data, as described in RFC1510 (variable length) + The AP-REP corresponding to the AP-REQ in the request packet. + KRB-PRIV or KRB-ERROR message, as described in RFC1510 (variable + length) + If the AP-REP length is zero, then this field contains a KRB-ERROR + message. Otherwise, it contains a KRB-PRIV message. This KRB- + PRIV message must be generated using the subkey in the + Authenticator in the AP-REQ data. + + The user-data component of the KRB-PRIV message, or e-data + component of the KRB-ERROR message, must consist of the following + data: + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | result code | result string / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + result code (16 bits) + The result code must have one of the following values (big- + endian integer): + 0x0000 if the request succeeds. (This value is not permitted + in a KRB-ERROR message.) + 0x0001 if the request fails due to being malformed + 0x0002 if the request fails due to a "hard" error processing + the request (for example, there is a resource or other + problem causing the request to fail) + 0x0003 if the request fails due to an error in authentication + processing + 0x0004 if the request fails due to a "soft" error processing + the request (for example, some policy or other similar + consideration is causing the request to be rejected). + 0xFFFF if the request fails for some other reason. + Although only a few non-zero result codes are specified here, + the client should accept any non-zero result code as indicating + failure. + result string (variable length) + This field should contain information which the server thinks + might be useful to the user, such as feedback about policy + failures. The string must be encoded in UTF-8. It may be + omitted if the server does not wish to include it. If it is + present, the client should display the string to the user. + This field is analogous to the string which follows the numeric + code in SMTP, FTP, and similar protocols. + + + + +Horowitz [Page 3] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + +Dropped and Modified Messages + + An attacker (or simply a lossy network) could cause either the + request or reply to be dropped, or modified by substituting a KRB- + ERROR message in the reply. + + If a request is dropped, no modification of the password/key database + will take place. If a reply is dropped, the server will (assuming a + valid request) make the password change. However, the client cannot + distinguish between these two cases. + + In this situation, the client should construct a new authenticator, + re-encrypt the request, and retransmit. If the original request was + lost, the server will treat this as a valid request, and the password + will be changed normally. If the reply was lost, then the server + should take care to notice that the request was a duplicate of the + prior request, because the "new" password is the current password, + and the password change time is within some implementation-defined + replay time window. The server should then return a success reply + (an AP-REP message with result code == 0x0000) without actually + changing the password or any other information (such as modification + timestamps). + + If a success reply was replaced with an error reply, then the + application performing the request would return an error to the user. + In this state, the user's password has been changed, but the user + believes that it has not. If the user attempts to change the + password again, this will probably fail, because the user cannot + successfully provide the old password to get an INITIAL ticket to + make the request. This situation requires administrative + intervention as if a password was lost. This situation is, + unfortunately, impossible to prevent. + + +Security Considerations + + This document deals with changing passwords for Kerberos. Because + Kerberos is used for authentication and key distribution, it is + important that this protocol use the highest level of security + services available to a particular installation. Mutual + authentication is performed, so that the server knows the request is + valid, and the client knows that the request has been received and + processed by the server. + + There are also security issues relating to dropped or modified + messages which are addressed explicitly. + + +References + + [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 4] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + +Author's Address + + Marc Horowitz + Stonecast, Inc. + 108 Stow Road + Harvard, MA 01451 + + Phone: +1 978 456 9103 + Email: marc@stonecast.net + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 5] + -- 2.26.2