From 0fbbcb8a73f7c22017e4602cff072b207a6c2999 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick McLean Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2019 16:04:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] net-misc/openssh: Version bump to 8.1_p1 (no X509 patch yet) Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.76, Repoman-2.3.17 Signed-off-by: Patrick McLean --- net-misc/openssh/Manifest | 2 + .../files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch | 359 ++++++++++++++ .../files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-glue.patch | 216 ++++++++ net-misc/openssh/openssh-8.1_p1.ebuild | 463 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 1040 insertions(+) create mode 100644 net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch create mode 100644 net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-glue.patch create mode 100644 net-misc/openssh/openssh-8.1_p1.ebuild diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/Manifest b/net-misc/openssh/Manifest index fb6e51679b23..b17750ef2432 100644 --- a/net-misc/openssh/Manifest +++ b/net-misc/openssh/Manifest @@ -16,4 +16,6 @@ DIST openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff 43356 BLAKE2B 776fa140d64a16 DIST openssh-8.0p1+x509-12.1-gentoo.diff.gz 680853 BLAKE2B b24ee61d6328bf2de8384d6ecbfc5ae0be4719a3c7a2d714be3a144d327bba5038e7e36ffcc313af2a8a94960ce1f56387654d2d21920af51826af61957aa4cc SHA512 178728139473b277fe50a03f37be50b3f8e539cea8f5937ddfe710082944e799d845cdb5994f585c13564c4a89b80ccf75e87753102aebacdb4c590f0b8a1482 DIST openssh-8.0p1-sctp-1.2.patch.xz 7348 BLAKE2B bc3d3815f1ef5dbab605b93182a00c2fec258f49d56684defb6564d2b60886429c615a7ab076cc071a590f9df0908b1862ceb0961b7e6f6d1090237fec9035d3 SHA512 2f9f774286db75d0240e6fb01655a8a193fb2a5dc4596ad68ed22d64f97c9c46dad61a06478f2e972fd37cbad4d9aca5829bb91097cc56638601ff94a972b24f DIST openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz 1597697 BLAKE2B 5ba79872eabb3b3964d95a8cdd690bfe0323f018d7f944d4e1acb52576c9f6d7a1ddac15e88dc42eac6ecbfabfad1c228e303a2262588769e307c38107a4cd54 SHA512 e280fa2d56f550efd37c5d2477670326261aa8b94d991f9eb17aad90e0c6c9c939efa90fe87d33260d0f709485cb05c379f0fd1bd44fc0d5190298b6398c9982 +DIST openssh-8.1p1-sctp-1.2.patch.xz 7672 BLAKE2B f1aa0713fcb114d8774bd8d524d106401a9d7c2c73a05fbde200ccbdd2562b3636ddd2d0bc3eae9f04b4d7c729c3dafd814ae8c530a76c4a0190fae71d1edcd2 SHA512 2bffab0bbae5a4c1875e0cc229bfd83d8565bd831309158cd489d8b877556c69b936243888a181bd9ff302e19f2c174156781574294d260b6384c464d003d566 +DIST openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz 1625894 BLAKE2B d525be921a6f49420a58df5ac434d43a0c85e0f6bf8428ecebf04117c50f473185933e6e4485e506ac614f71887a513b9962d7b47969ba785da8e3a38f767322 SHA512 b987ea4ffd4ab0c94110723860273b06ed8ffb4d21cbd99ca144a4722dc55f4bf86f6253d500386b6bee7af50f066e2aa2dd095d50746509a10e11221d39d925 DIST openssh-lpk-7.5p1-0.3.14.patch.xz 17040 BLAKE2B 5b2204316dd244bb8dd11db50d5bc3a194e2cc4b64964a2d3df68bbe54c53588f15fc5176dbc3811e929573fa3e41cf91f412aa2513bb9a4b6ed02c2523c1e24 SHA512 9ce5d7e5d831c972f0f866b686bf93a048a03979ab38627973f5491eeeaa45f9faab0520b3a7ed90a13a67213fdc9cd4cf11e423acad441ea91b71037c8b435b diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6aba6f266945 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c +index ca450f4e..2994a4e4 100644 +--- a/auth.c ++++ b/auth.c +@@ -723,120 +723,6 @@ fakepw(void) + return (&fake); + } + +-/* +- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not +- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is +- * called. +- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some +- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. +- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? +- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) +- */ +- +-static char * +-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) +-{ +- struct sockaddr_storage from; +- socklen_t fromlen; +- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; +- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; +- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); +- +- /* Get IP address of client. */ +- fromlen = sizeof(from); +- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); +- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), +- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { +- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- +- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); +- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) +- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); +- +- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); +- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ +- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), +- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { +- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- +- /* +- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, +- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: +- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 +- */ +- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); +- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ +- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; +- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { +- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", +- name, ntop); +- freeaddrinfo(ai); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- +- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ +- lowercase(name); +- +- /* +- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given +- * address actually is an address of this host. This is +- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can +- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from +- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be +- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of +- * the domain). +- */ +- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); +- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; +- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; +- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { +- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " +- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ +- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { +- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, +- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && +- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) +- break; +- } +- freeaddrinfo(aitop); +- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ +- if (ai == NULL) { +- /* Address not found for the host name. */ +- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " +- "map back to the address.", ntop, name); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- return strdup(name); +-} +- +-/* +- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current +- * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this +- * several times. +- */ +- +-const char * +-auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) +-{ +- static char *dnsname; +- +- if (!use_dns) +- return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); +- else if (dnsname != NULL) +- return dnsname; +- else { +- dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); +- return dnsname; +- } +-} +- + /* + * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment. + * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure. +diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c +index abea9c6e..4f4524d2 100644 +--- a/canohost.c ++++ b/canohost.c +@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock) + { + return get_sock_port(sock, 1); + } ++ ++/* ++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not ++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is ++ * called. ++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some ++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. ++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? ++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) ++ */ ++ ++static char * ++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct sockaddr_storage from; ++ socklen_t fromlen; ++ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; ++ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; ++ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); ++ ++ /* Get IP address of client. */ ++ fromlen = sizeof(from); ++ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); ++ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), ++ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { ++ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); ++ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) ++ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); ++ ++ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); ++ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ ++ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), ++ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { ++ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, ++ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: ++ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 ++ */ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; ++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { ++ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", ++ name, ntop); ++ freeaddrinfo(ai); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ ++ lowercase(name); ++ ++ /* ++ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given ++ * address actually is an address of this host. This is ++ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can ++ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from ++ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be ++ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of ++ * the domain). ++ */ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { ++ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " ++ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ ++ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { ++ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, ++ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && ++ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) ++ break; ++ } ++ freeaddrinfo(aitop); ++ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ ++ if (ai == NULL) { ++ /* Address not found for the host name. */ ++ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " ++ "map back to the address.", ntop, name); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ return strdup(name); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current ++ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this ++ * several times. ++ */ ++ ++const char * ++auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) ++{ ++ static char *dnsname; ++ ++ if (!use_dns) ++ return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); ++ else if (dnsname != NULL) ++ return dnsname; ++ else { ++ dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); ++ return dnsname; ++ } ++} +diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c +index f78b4d6f..747287f7 100644 +--- a/readconf.c ++++ b/readconf.c +@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ typedef enum { + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, ++ oGssTrustDns, + oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, + oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, + oHashKnownHosts, +@@ -203,9 +204,11 @@ static struct { + #if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, + # else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, + #endif + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, +@@ -992,6 +995,10 @@ parse_time: + intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssTrustDns: ++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1864,6 +1871,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->gss_authentication = -1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; +@@ -2011,6 +2019,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + options->gss_authentication = 0; + if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) + options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; ++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) ++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h +index 8e36bf32..c9e4718d 100644 +--- a/readconf.h ++++ b/readconf.h +@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ typedef struct { + /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ + int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ + int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ ++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ +diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 +index 02a87892..95de538b 100644 +--- a/ssh_config.5 ++++ b/ssh_config.5 +@@ -762,6 +762,16 @@ The default is + Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. + The default is + .Cm no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. ++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns ++Set to ++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize ++the name of the host being connected to. If ++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the ++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index 87fa70a4..a6ffdc96 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -697,6 +697,13 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) + OM_uint32 min; + int r, ok = 0; + gss_OID mech = NULL; ++ const char *gss_host; ++ ++ if (options.gss_trust_dns) { ++ extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns); ++ gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, 1); ++ } else ++ gss_host = authctxt->host; + + /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at + * once. */ +@@ -711,7 +718,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) + elements[authctxt->mech_tried]; + /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ + if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, +- mech, authctxt->host)) { ++ mech, gss_host)) { + ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ + } else { + authctxt->mech_tried++; diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-glue.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0ad814f95d87 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-glue.patch @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +Only in b: .openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff.un~ +Only in b: .openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff.un~ +diff -ru a/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff b/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff +--- a/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff 2019-10-10 13:48:31.513603947 -0700 ++++ b/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff 2019-10-10 13:50:15.012495676 -0700 +@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ + canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \ + - cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \ + + cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o cipher-ctr-mt.o \ +- compat.o crc32.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ +- log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o opacket.o \ ++ compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ ++ log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \ + readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \ + diff --git a/cipher-ctr-mt.c b/cipher-ctr-mt.c + new file mode 100644 +@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ + + * so we repoint the define to the multithreaded evp. To start the threads we + + * then force a rekey + + */ +-+ const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(active_state); +++ const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(ssh); + + + + /* only do this for the ctr cipher. otherwise gcm mode breaks. Don't know why though */ + + if (strstr(cipher_ctx_name(cc), "ctr")) { +@@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ + + * so we repoint the define to the multithreaded evp. To start the threads we + + * then force a rekey + + */ +-+ const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(active_state); +++ const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(ssh); + + + + /* only rekey if necessary. If we don't do this gcm mode cipher breaks */ + + if (strstr(cipher_ctx_name(cc), "ctr")) { +diff -ru a/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff b/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff +--- a/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff 2019-10-10 13:47:54.801642144 -0700 ++++ b/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff 2019-10-10 15:58:05.085803333 -0700 +@@ -162,24 +162,24 @@ + } + + +static int +-+channel_tcpwinsz(void) +++channel_tcpwinsz(struct ssh *ssh) + +{ + + u_int32_t tcpwinsz = 0; + + socklen_t optsz = sizeof(tcpwinsz); + + int ret = -1; + + + + /* if we aren't on a socket return 128KB */ +-+ if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket()) +++ if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) + + return 128 * 1024; + + +-+ ret = getsockopt(packet_get_connection_in(), +++ ret = getsockopt(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), + + SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &tcpwinsz, &optsz); + + /* return no more than SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */ + + if ((ret == 0) && tcpwinsz > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) + + tcpwinsz = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX; + + + + debug2("tcpwinsz: tcp connection %d, Receive window: %d", +-+ packet_get_connection_in(), tcpwinsz); +++ ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), tcpwinsz); + + return tcpwinsz; + +} + + +@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ + c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) && + c->local_consumed > 0) { + + u_int addition = 0; +-+ u_int32_t tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz(); +++ u_int32_t tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz(ssh); + + /* adjust max window size if we are in a dynamic environment */ + + if (c->dynamic_window && (tcpwinsz > c->local_window_max)) { + + /* grow the window somewhat aggressively to maintain pressure */ +@@ -409,18 +409,10 @@ + index dcf35e6..da4ced0 100644 + --- a/packet.c + +++ b/packet.c +-@@ -920,6 +920,24 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) ++@@ -920,6 +920,16 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) + return 0; + } + +-+/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */ +-+int rekey_requested = 0; +-+void +-+packet_request_rekeying(void) +-+{ +-+ rekey_requested = 1; +-+} +-+ + +/* used to determine if pre or post auth when rekeying for aes-ctr + + * and none cipher switch */ + +int +@@ -434,20 +426,6 @@ + #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31) + static int + ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) +-@@ -946,6 +964,13 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) +- if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0) +- return 0; +- +-+ /* used to force rekeying when called for by the none +-+ * cipher switch methods -cjr */ +-+ if (rekey_requested == 1) { +-+ rekey_requested = 0; +-+ return 1; +-+ } +-+ +- /* Time-based rekeying */ +- if (state->rekey_interval != 0 && +- (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime()) + diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h + index 170203c..f4d9df2 100644 + --- a/packet.h +@@ -476,9 +454,9 @@ + /* Format of the configuration file: + + @@ -166,6 +167,8 @@ typedef enum { +- oHashKnownHosts, + oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, + oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand, ++ oDisableMTAES, + + oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf, oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize, + + oNoneEnabled, oNoneSwitch, + oVisualHostKey, +@@ -615,9 +593,9 @@ + int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ + SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ + @@ -111,7 +115,10 @@ typedef struct { +- + int enable_ssh_keysign; + int64_t rekey_limit; ++ int disable_multithreaded; /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr*/ + + int none_switch; /* Use none cipher */ + + int none_enabled; /* Allow none to be used */ + int rekey_interval; +@@ -633,7 +611,7 @@ + off_t i, statbytes; + size_t amt, nr; + int fd = -1, haderr, indx; +-- char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[PATH_MAX]; ++- char *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + 128], encname[PATH_MAX]; + + char *last, *name, buf[16384], encname[PATH_MAX]; + int len; + +@@ -673,9 +651,9 @@ + /* Portable-specific options */ + if (options->use_pam == -1) + @@ -391,6 +400,43 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) +- } +- if (options->permit_tun == -1) + options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; ++ if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1) ++ options->disable_multithreaded = 0; + + if (options->none_enabled == -1) + + options->none_enabled = 0; + + if (options->hpn_disabled == -1) +@@ -1092,7 +1070,7 @@ + xxx_host = host; + xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; + +-@@ -412,6 +423,28 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, ++@@ -412,6 +423,27 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, + + if (!authctxt.success) + fatal("Authentication failed."); +@@ -1108,7 +1086,7 @@ + + memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal)); + + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; + + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none"; +-+ kex_prop2buf(active_state->kex->my, myproposal); +++ kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal); + + packet_request_rekeying(); + + fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER\n"); + + } else { +@@ -1117,23 +1095,13 @@ + + fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n"); + + } + + } +-+ +- debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name); +- } + ++ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) { + diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c + index a738c3a..b32dbe0 100644 + --- a/sshd.c + +++ b/sshd.c +-@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out) +- char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ +- +- xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n", +-- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, +-+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE, +- *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ", +- options.version_addendum); +- + @@ -1037,6 +1037,8 @@ listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la) + int ret, listen_sock; + struct addrinfo *ai; +@@ -1217,11 +1185,10 @@ + index f1bbf00..21a70c2 100644 + --- a/version.h + +++ b/version.h +-@@ -3,4 +3,6 @@ ++@@ -3,4 +3,5 @@ + #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.8" + + #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" + -#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE +-+#define SSH_HPN "-hpn14v16" + +#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN + + diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/openssh-8.1_p1.ebuild b/net-misc/openssh/openssh-8.1_p1.ebuild new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..edc1b5697eee --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/openssh-8.1_p1.ebuild @@ -0,0 +1,463 @@ +# Copyright 1999-2019 Gentoo Authors +# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 + +EAPI=7 + +inherit user flag-o-matic multilib autotools pam systemd + +# Make it more portable between straight releases +# and _p? releases. +PARCH=${P/_} +#HPN_PV="${PV^^}" +HPN_PV="7.8_P1" + +HPN_VER="14.16" +HPN_PATCHES=( + ${PN}-${HPN_PV/./_}-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-${HPN_VER}.diff + ${PN}-${HPN_PV/./_}-hpn-AES-CTR-${HPN_VER}.diff +) + +SCTP_VER="1.2" SCTP_PATCH="${PARCH}-sctp-${SCTP_VER}.patch.xz" +#X509_VER="12.1" X509_PATCH="${PARCH}+x509-${X509_VER}.diff.gz" + +PATCH_SET="openssh-7.9p1-patches-1.0" + +DESCRIPTION="Port of OpenBSD's free SSH release" +HOMEPAGE="https://www.openssh.com/" +SRC_URI="mirror://openbsd/OpenSSH/portable/${PARCH}.tar.gz + ${SCTP_PATCH:+sctp? ( https://dev.gentoo.org/~chutzpah/dist/openssh/${SCTP_PATCH} )} + ${HPN_VER:+hpn? ( $(printf "mirror://sourceforge/hpnssh/HPN-SSH%%20${HPN_VER/./v}%%20${HPN_PV/_P/p}/%s\n" "${HPN_PATCHES[@]}") )} + ${X509_PATCH:+X509? ( https://roumenpetrov.info/openssh/x509-${X509_VER}/${X509_PATCH} )} + " + +LICENSE="BSD GPL-2" +SLOT="0" +KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~x86 ~ppc-aix ~x64-cygwin ~amd64-linux ~x86-linux ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x86-macos ~m68k-mint ~sparc-solaris ~sparc64-solaris ~x64-solaris ~x86-solaris" +# Probably want to drop ssl defaulting to on in a future version. +IUSE="abi_mips_n32 audit bindist debug hpn kerberos kernel_linux ldns libedit libressl livecd pam +pie sctp selinux +ssl static test X X509 xmss" +RESTRICT="!test? ( test )" +REQUIRED_USE="ldns? ( ssl ) + pie? ( !static ) + static? ( !kerberos !pam ) + X509? ( !sctp ssl ) + test? ( ssl )" + +LIB_DEPEND=" + audit? ( sys-process/audit[static-libs(+)] ) + ldns? ( + net-libs/ldns[static-libs(+)] + !bindist? ( net-libs/ldns[ecdsa,ssl(+)] ) + bindist? ( net-libs/ldns[-ecdsa,ssl(+)] ) + ) + libedit? ( dev-libs/libedit:=[static-libs(+)] ) + sctp? ( net-misc/lksctp-tools[static-libs(+)] ) + selinux? ( >=sys-libs/libselinux-1.28[static-libs(+)] ) + ssl? ( + !libressl? ( + || ( + ( + >=dev-libs/openssl-1.0.1:0[bindist=] + =dev-libs/openssl-1.1.0g:0[bindist=] + ) + dev-libs/openssl:0=[static-libs(+)] + ) + libressl? ( dev-libs/libressl:0=[static-libs(+)] ) + ) + >=sys-libs/zlib-1.2.3:=[static-libs(+)]" +RDEPEND=" + !static? ( ${LIB_DEPEND//\[static-libs(+)]} ) + pam? ( virtual/pam ) + kerberos? ( virtual/krb5 )" +DEPEND="${RDEPEND} + static? ( ${LIB_DEPEND} ) + virtual/pkgconfig + virtual/os-headers + sys-devel/autoconf" +RDEPEND="${RDEPEND} + pam? ( >=sys-auth/pambase-20081028 ) + userland_GNU? ( virtual/shadow ) + X? ( x11-apps/xauth )" + +S="${WORKDIR}/${PARCH}" + +pkg_pretend() { + # this sucks, but i'd rather have people unable to `emerge -u openssh` + # than not be able to log in to their server any more + maybe_fail() { [[ -z ${!2} ]] && echo "$1" ; } + local fail=" + $(use hpn && maybe_fail hpn HPN_VER) + $(use sctp && maybe_fail sctp SCTP_PATCH) + $(use X509 && maybe_fail X509 X509_PATCH) + " + fail=$(echo ${fail}) + if [[ -n ${fail} ]] ; then + eerror "Sorry, but this version does not yet support features" + eerror "that you requested: ${fail}" + eerror "Please mask ${PF} for now and check back later:" + eerror " # echo '=${CATEGORY}/${PF}' >> /etc/portage/package.mask" + die "booooo" + fi + + # Make sure people who are using tcp wrappers are notified of its removal. #531156 + if grep -qs '^ *sshd *:' "${EROOT%/}"/etc/hosts.{allow,deny} ; then + ewarn "Sorry, but openssh no longer supports tcp-wrappers, and it seems like" + ewarn "you're trying to use it. Update your ${EROOT}etc/hosts.{allow,deny} please." + fi +} + +src_prepare() { + sed -i \ + -e "/_PATH_XAUTH/s:/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth:${EPREFIX%/}/usr/bin/xauth:" \ + pathnames.h || die + + # don't break .ssh/authorized_keys2 for fun + sed -i '/^AuthorizedKeysFile/s:^:#:' sshd_config || die + + eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.9_p1-include-stdlib.patch + eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch #165444 integrated into gsskex + eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch + eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.5_p1-disable-conch-interop-tests.patch + eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.0_p1-fix-putty-tests.patch + eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.0_p1-deny-shmget-shmat-shmdt-in-preauth-privsep-child.patch + + [[ -d ${WORKDIR}/patches ]] && eapply "${WORKDIR}"/patches + + local PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS=() + + if use X509 ; then + pushd "${WORKDIR}" &>/dev/null || die + eapply "${FILESDIR}/${P}-X509-glue-"${X509_VER}".patch" + eapply "${FILESDIR}/${P}-X509-dont-make-piddir-"${X509_VER}".patch" + popd &>/dev/null || die + + eapply "${WORKDIR}"/${X509_PATCH%.*} + eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-X509-$(ver_cut 1-2 ${X509_VER})-tests.patch + + # We need to patch package version or any X.509 sshd will reject our ssh client + # with "userauth_pubkey: could not parse key: string is too large [preauth]" + # error + einfo "Patching package version for X.509 patch set ..." + sed -i \ + -e "s/^AC_INIT(\[OpenSSH\], \[Portable\]/AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [${X509_VER}]/" \ + "${S}"/configure.ac || die "Failed to patch package version for X.509 patch" + + einfo "Patching version.h to expose X.509 patch set ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE.*/a #define SSH_X509 \"-PKIXSSH-${X509_VER}\"" \ + "${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in X.509 patch version" + PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_X509' ) + fi + + if use sctp ; then + eapply "${WORKDIR}"/${SCTP_PATCH%.*} + + einfo "Patching version.h to expose SCTP patch set ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE/a #define SSH_SCTP \"-sctp-${SCTP_VER}\"" \ + "${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in SCTP patch version" + PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_SCTP' ) + + einfo "Disabling know failing test (cfgparse) caused by SCTP patch ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/\t\tcfgparse \\\/d" \ + "${S}"/regress/Makefile || die "Failed to disable known failing test (cfgparse) caused by SCTP patch" + fi + + if use hpn ; then + local hpn_patchdir="${T}/${P}-hpn${HPN_VER}" + mkdir "${hpn_patchdir}" + cp $(printf -- "${DISTDIR}/%s\n" "${HPN_PATCHES[@]}") "${hpn_patchdir}" + pushd "${hpn_patchdir}" &>/dev/null || die + eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.1_p1-hpn-glue.patch + if use X509; then + einfo "Will disable MT AES cipher due to incompatbility caused by X509 patch set" + # X509 and AES-CTR-MT don't get along, let's just drop it + rm openssh-${HPN_PV//./_}-hpn-AES-CTR-${HPN_VER}.diff || die + eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.0_p1-hpn-X509-glue.patch + fi + use sctp && eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.9_p1-hpn-sctp-glue.patch + popd &>/dev/null || die + + eapply "${hpn_patchdir}" + + if ! use X509; then + eapply "${FILESDIR}/openssh-7.9_p1-hpn-openssl-1.1.patch" + eapply "${FILESDIR}/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-version.patch" + fi + + einfo "Patching Makefile.in for HPN patch set ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/^LIBS=/ s/\$/ -lpthread/" \ + "${S}"/Makefile.in || die "Failed to patch Makefile.in" + + einfo "Patching version.h to expose HPN patch set ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE/a #define SSH_HPN \"-hpn${HPN_VER//./v}\"" \ + "${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in HPN patch version" + PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_HPN' ) + + if [[ -n "${HPN_DISABLE_MTAES}" ]] ; then + einfo "Disabling known non-working MT AES cipher per default ..." + + cat > "${T}"/disable_mtaes.conf <<- EOF + + # HPN's Multi-Threaded AES CTR cipher is currently known to be broken + # and therefore disabled per default. + DisableMTAES yes + EOF + sed -i \ + -e "/^#HPNDisabled.*/r ${T}/disable_mtaes.conf" \ + "${S}"/sshd_config || die "Failed to disabled MT AES ciphers in sshd_config" + + sed -i \ + -e "/AcceptEnv.*_XXX_TEST$/a \\\tDisableMTAES\t\tyes" \ + "${S}"/regress/test-exec.sh || die "Failed to disable MT AES ciphers in test config" + fi + fi + + if use X509 || use sctp || use hpn ; then + einfo "Patching sshconnect.c to use SSH_RELEASE in send_client_banner() ..." + sed -i \ + -e "s/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE/" \ + "${S}"/sshconnect.c || die "Failed to patch send_client_banner() to use SSH_RELEASE (sshconnect.c)" + + einfo "Patching sshd.c to use SSH_RELEASE in sshd_exchange_identification() ..." + sed -i \ + -e "s/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE/" \ + "${S}"/sshd.c || die "Failed to patch sshd_exchange_identification() to use SSH_RELEASE (sshd.c)" + + einfo "Patching version.h to add our patch sets to SSH_RELEASE ..." + sed -i \ + -e "s/^#define SSH_RELEASE.*/#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE ${PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS[*]}/" \ + "${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to patch SSH_RELEASE (version.h)" + fi + + sed -i \ + -e "/#UseLogin no/d" \ + "${S}"/sshd_config || die "Failed to remove removed UseLogin option (sshd_config)" + + eapply_user #473004 + + tc-export PKG_CONFIG + local sed_args=( + -e "s:-lcrypto:$(${PKG_CONFIG} --libs openssl):" + # Disable PATH reset, trust what portage gives us #254615 + -e 's:^PATH=/:#PATH=/:' + # Disable fortify flags ... our gcc does this for us + -e 's:-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2::' + ) + + # The -ftrapv flag ICEs on hppa #505182 + use hppa && sed_args+=( + -e '/CFLAGS/s:-ftrapv:-fdisable-this-test:' + -e '/OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK.*-ftrapv/d' + ) + # _XOPEN_SOURCE causes header conflicts on Solaris + [[ ${CHOST} == *-solaris* ]] && sed_args+=( + -e 's/-D_XOPEN_SOURCE//' + ) + sed -i "${sed_args[@]}" configure{.ac,} || die + + eautoreconf +} + +src_configure() { + addwrite /dev/ptmx + + use debug && append-cppflags -DSANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG + use static && append-ldflags -static + use xmss && append-cflags -DWITH_XMSS + + local myconf=( + --with-ldflags="${LDFLAGS}" + --disable-strip + --with-pid-dir="${EPREFIX}"$(usex kernel_linux '' '/var')/run + --sysconfdir="${EPREFIX%/}"/etc/ssh + --libexecdir="${EPREFIX%/}"/usr/$(get_libdir)/misc + --datadir="${EPREFIX%/}"/usr/share/openssh + --with-privsep-path="${EPREFIX%/}"/var/empty + --with-privsep-user=sshd + $(use_with audit audit linux) + $(use_with kerberos kerberos5 "${EPREFIX%/}"/usr) + # We apply the sctp patch conditionally, so can't pass --without-sctp + # unconditionally else we get unknown flag warnings. + $(use sctp && use_with sctp) + $(use_with ldns ldns "${EPREFIX%/}"/usr) + $(use_with libedit) + $(use_with pam) + $(use_with pie) + $(use_with selinux) + $(use_with ssl openssl) + $(use_with ssl md5-passwords) + $(use_with ssl ssl-engine) + $(use_with !elibc_Cygwin hardening) #659210 + ) + + # stackprotect is broken on musl x86 and ppc + use elibc_musl && ( use x86 || use ppc ) && myconf+=( --without-stackprotect ) + + # The seccomp sandbox is broken on x32, so use the older method for now. #553748 + use amd64 && [[ ${ABI} == "x32" ]] && myconf+=( --with-sandbox=rlimit ) + + econf "${myconf[@]}" +} + +src_test() { + local t skipped=() failed=() passed=() + local tests=( interop-tests compat-tests ) + + local shell=$(egetshell "${UID}") + if [[ ${shell} == */nologin ]] || [[ ${shell} == */false ]] ; then + elog "Running the full OpenSSH testsuite requires a usable shell for the 'portage'" + elog "user, so we will run a subset only." + skipped+=( tests ) + else + tests+=( tests ) + fi + + # It will also attempt to write to the homedir .ssh. + local sshhome=${T}/homedir + mkdir -p "${sshhome}"/.ssh + for t in "${tests[@]}" ; do + # Some tests read from stdin ... + HOMEDIR="${sshhome}" HOME="${sshhome}" SUDO="" \ + emake -k -j1 ${t} > "${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config + + # Allow client to pass locale environment variables. #367017 + AcceptEnv ${locale_vars[*]} + + # Allow client to pass COLORTERM to match TERM. #658540 + AcceptEnv COLORTERM + EOF + + # Then the client config. + cat <<-EOF >> "${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/ssh_config + + # Send locale environment variables. #367017 + SendEnv ${locale_vars[*]} + + # Send COLORTERM to match TERM. #658540 + SendEnv COLORTERM + EOF + + if use pam ; then + sed -i \ + -e "/^#UsePAM /s:.*:UsePAM yes:" \ + -e "/^#PasswordAuthentication /s:.*:PasswordAuthentication no:" \ + -e "/^#PrintMotd /s:.*:PrintMotd no:" \ + -e "/^#PrintLastLog /s:.*:PrintLastLog no:" \ + "${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config || die + fi + + if use livecd ; then + sed -i \ + -e '/^#PermitRootLogin/c# Allow root login with password on livecds.\nPermitRootLogin Yes' \ + "${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config || die + fi +} + +src_install() { + emake install-nokeys DESTDIR="${D}" + fperms 600 /etc/ssh/sshd_config + dobin contrib/ssh-copy-id + newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd-r1.initd sshd + newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd-r1.confd sshd + + newpamd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.pam_include.2 sshd + + tweak_ssh_configs + + doman contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 + dodoc CREDITS OVERVIEW README* TODO sshd_config + use hpn && dodoc HPN-README + use X509 || dodoc ChangeLog + + diropts -m 0700 + dodir /etc/skel/.ssh + + keepdir /var/empty + + systemd_dounit "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.{service,socket} + systemd_newunit "${FILESDIR}"/sshd_at.service 'sshd@.service' +} + +pkg_preinst() { + enewgroup sshd 22 + enewuser sshd 22 -1 /var/empty sshd +} + +pkg_postinst() { + if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-5.8_p1" ; then + elog "Starting with openssh-5.8p1, the server will default to a newer key" + elog "algorithm (ECDSA). You are encouraged to manually update your stored" + elog "keys list as servers update theirs. See ssh-keyscan(1) for more info." + fi + if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.0_p1" ; then + elog "Starting with openssh-6.7, support for USE=tcpd has been dropped by upstream." + elog "Make sure to update any configs that you might have. Note that xinetd might" + elog "be an alternative for you as it supports USE=tcpd." + fi + if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.1_p1" ; then #557388 #555518 + elog "Starting with openssh-7.0, support for ssh-dss keys were disabled due to their" + elog "weak sizes. If you rely on these key types, you can re-enable the key types by" + elog "adding to your sshd_config or ~/.ssh/config files:" + elog " PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=+ssh-dss" + elog "You should however generate new keys using rsa or ed25519." + + elog "Starting with openssh-7.0, the default for PermitRootLogin changed from 'yes'" + elog "to 'prohibit-password'. That means password auth for root users no longer works" + elog "out of the box. If you need this, please update your sshd_config explicitly." + fi + if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.6_p1" ; then + elog "Starting with openssh-7.6p1, openssh upstream has removed ssh1 support entirely." + elog "Furthermore, rsa keys with less than 1024 bits will be refused." + fi + if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.7_p1" ; then + elog "Starting with openssh-7.7p1, we no longer patch openssh to provide LDAP functionality." + elog "Install sys-auth/ssh-ldap-pubkey and use OpenSSH's \"AuthorizedKeysCommand\" option" + elog "if you need to authenticate against LDAP." + elog "See https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/SSH/LDAP_migration for more details." + fi + if ! use ssl && has_version "${CATEGORY}/${PN}[ssl]" ; then + elog "Be aware that by disabling openssl support in openssh, the server and clients" + elog "no longer support dss/rsa/ecdsa keys. You will need to generate ed25519 keys" + elog "and update all clients/servers that utilize them." + fi + + if use hpn && [[ -n "${HPN_DISABLE_MTAES}" ]] ; then + elog "" + elog "HPN's multi-threaded AES CTR cipher is currently known to be broken" + elog "and therefore disabled at runtime per default." + elog "Make sure your sshd_config is up to date and contains" + elog "" + elog " DisableMTAES yes" + elog "" + elog "Otherwise you maybe unable to connect to this sshd using any AES CTR cipher." + elog "" + fi +} -- 2.26.2