From: Mark Eichin Date: Sat, 24 Feb 1996 00:18:51 +0000 (+0000) Subject: This is the aggregate of a bunch of fixes to kadmind (after all, some people X-Git-Tag: krb5-1.0-beta6~489 X-Git-Url: http://git.tremily.us/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=7f4d534cdac7f2c4d534ea0b7115d2fdc5f4df17;p=krb5.git This is the aggregate of a bunch of fixes to kadmind (after all, some people actually use it.) Note that in admin.c, I shredded admin_add_modify and admin_merge_dbentries, converting them to a goto-exception style, eliminating the excessive nesting, so they were readable; having done so, admin_add_modify turned out to be correct, and admin_merge_dbentries was "obviously" broken in that it assigned random keys gratuitiously. Fixing this causes "modent" to actually work, without destroying the key... Wed Feb 21 21:26:50 1996 Mark Eichin * srv_main.c (xprintf): handle VARARGS. Sun Feb 18 00:08:02 1996 Mark W. Eichin * admin.c (admin_merge_dbentries): rewrite for readability, and fix the year old bug of modify randomizing the password field. (admin_add_modify): rewrite for readability. Fri Feb 9 20:11:50 1996 Mark Eichin * srv_net.c (net_init): gethostbyname doesn't use errno, compensate by using KRB5_ERR_BAD_HOSTNAME. Tue Dec 12 19:14:51 1995 Mark Eichin * admin.c (admin_merge_dbentries): new argument mod_only, to distinguish between add and modify. (admin_add_modify): new argument mod_only, to distinguish between add and modify (and pass through to admin_merge_dbentries.) (admin_add_principal, admin_modify_principal, admin_change_opwd, admin_change_orandpw): pass flag indicating modify or add. Tue Sep 26 22:51:25 1995 Mark Eichin * admin.c (admin_add_modify): copy, don't just assign, principals to avoid double-freeing. Zero out "contents" and mod_name fields after freeing, likewise. Free cur_dbentry and new_dbentry properly. Tue Sep 26 02:56:41 1995 Mark Eichin * srv_acl.c (acl_free_entries): jump the ae_next link *before* freeing the item so we don't lose it. Tue Sep 26 02:28:35 1995 Mark Eichin * admin.c (admin_merge_dbentries): copy who into dbentp->mod_name because callers will free it after successful use. git-svn-id: svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5/trunk@7506 dc483132-0cff-0310-8789-dd5450dbe970 --- diff --git a/src/kadmin/v5server/ChangeLog b/src/kadmin/v5server/ChangeLog index 52a4fb7d7..1337eb55f 100644 --- a/src/kadmin/v5server/ChangeLog +++ b/src/kadmin/v5server/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,43 @@ +Wed Feb 21 21:26:50 1996 Mark Eichin + + * srv_main.c (xprintf): handle VARARGS. + +Sun Feb 18 00:08:02 1996 Mark W. Eichin + + * admin.c (admin_merge_dbentries): rewrite for readability, and + fix the year old bug of modify randomizing the password field. + (admin_add_modify): rewrite for readability. + +Fri Feb 9 20:11:50 1996 Mark Eichin + + * srv_net.c (net_init): gethostbyname doesn't use errno, + compensate by using KRB5_ERR_BAD_HOSTNAME. + +Tue Dec 12 19:14:51 1995 Mark Eichin + + * admin.c (admin_merge_dbentries): new argument mod_only, to + distinguish between add and modify. + (admin_add_modify): new argument mod_only, to distinguish between + add and modify (and pass through to admin_merge_dbentries.) + (admin_add_principal, admin_modify_principal, admin_change_opwd, + admin_change_orandpw): pass flag indicating modify or add. + +Tue Sep 26 22:51:25 1995 Mark Eichin + + * admin.c (admin_add_modify): copy, don't just assign, principals + to avoid double-freeing. Zero out "contents" and mod_name fields + after freeing, likewise. Free cur_dbentry and new_dbentry properly. + +Tue Sep 26 02:56:41 1995 Mark Eichin + + * srv_acl.c (acl_free_entries): jump the ae_next link *before* + freeing the item so we don't lose it. + +Tue Sep 26 02:28:35 1995 Mark Eichin + + * admin.c (admin_merge_dbentries): copy who into dbentp->mod_name + because callers will free it after successful use. + Wed Sep 13 22:08:56 1995 Theodore Y. Ts'o (tytso@dcl) * srv_key.c (key_string2key_keysalt and key_randomkey_keysalt): diff --git a/src/kadmin/v5server/admin.c b/src/kadmin/v5server/admin.c index 76304f8f0..351ecd80c 100644 --- a/src/kadmin/v5server/admin.c +++ b/src/kadmin/v5server/admin.c @@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ admin_merge_keys(kcontext, dbentp, unique, xxx2.n_key_data = nkeys2; xxx2.key_data = in2; for (i=0; iprinc && - (!password || ((valid & KRB5_ADM_M_RANDOMKEY) == 0))) { - - /* - * Now fill in unsupplied values from defaults. - */ - if ((valid & KRB5_ADM_M_MAXLIFE) == 0) - dbentp->max_life = defaultp->max_life; - if ((valid & KRB5_ADM_M_MAXRENEWLIFE) == 0) - dbentp->max_renewable_life = defaultp->max_renewable_life; - if ((valid & KRB5_ADM_M_EXPIRATION) == 0) - dbentp->expiration = defaultp->expiration; - if ((valid & KRB5_ADM_M_PWEXPIRATION) == 0) - dbentp->pw_expiration = defaultp->pw_expiration; - if ((valid & KRB5_ADM_M_FLAGS) == 0) - dbentp->attributes = defaultp->attributes; - - /* - * Now fill in un-suppliable values from our data. - */ - dbentp->last_success = defaultp->last_success; - dbentp->last_failed = defaultp->last_failed; - dbentp->fail_auth_count = defaultp->fail_auth_count; - dbentp->len = defaultp->len; - kret = 0; - - /* - * Update last password change (if appropriate) and modification - * date and principal. - */ - if (!(kret = key_update_tl_attrs(kcontext, - dbentp, - who, - (password || is_pwchange)))) { + if (!dbentp->princ) { + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> no principal supplied???")); + goto bailout; + } + if (password && (valid & KRB5_ADM_M_RANDOMKEY)) { + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> password and randomkey???")); + goto bailout; + } + /* + * Now fill in unsupplied values from defaults. + */ + if ((valid & KRB5_ADM_M_MAXLIFE) == 0) + dbentp->max_life = defaultp->max_life; + if ((valid & KRB5_ADM_M_MAXRENEWLIFE) == 0) + dbentp->max_renewable_life = defaultp->max_renewable_life; + if ((valid & KRB5_ADM_M_EXPIRATION) == 0) + dbentp->expiration = defaultp->expiration; + if ((valid & KRB5_ADM_M_PWEXPIRATION) == 0) + dbentp->pw_expiration = defaultp->pw_expiration; + if ((valid & KRB5_ADM_M_FLAGS) == 0) + dbentp->attributes = defaultp->attributes; -#ifndef USE_KDB5_CPW - /* See if this is a random key or not */ - if (password) { - krb5_data pwdata; + /* + * Now fill in un-suppliable values from our data. + */ + dbentp->last_success = defaultp->last_success; + dbentp->last_failed = defaultp->last_failed; + dbentp->fail_auth_count = defaultp->fail_auth_count; - DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> string-to-key\n")); - /* - * Now handle string-to-key and salt. - */ - pwdata.data = password; - pwdata.length = strlen(password); - - /* Convert password string to key */ - if (!(kret = key_string_to_keys(kcontext, - ((is_pwchange) ? defaultp : - dbentp), - &pwdata, - 0, - (krb5_key_salt_tuple *) NULL, - &num_keys, - &key_list))) { - /* Encrypt the keys */ - DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> encode\n")); - num_ekeys = num_keys; - kret = key_encrypt_keys(kcontext, - defaultp, - &num_ekeys, - key_list, - &ekey_list); - if (!kret) { - num_rkeys = (krb5_int32) dbentp->n_key_data; - kret = admin_merge_keys(kcontext, - defaultp, - 1, - num_ekeys, - ekey_list, - (krb5_int32) - defaultp->n_key_data, - defaultp->key_data, - &num_rkeys, - &dbentp->key_data); - dbentp->n_key_data = (krb5_int16) num_rkeys; - } - } - } - else { - /* Random key */ - DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> random key\n")); - if (!(kret = key_random_key(kcontext, - ((is_pwchange) ? defaultp : - dbentp), - &num_keys, - &key_list))) { - - /* Encrypt the keys */ - DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> encode\n")); - num_ekeys = num_keys; - kret = key_encrypt_keys(kcontext, - defaultp, - &num_ekeys, - key_list, - &ekey_list); - if (!kret) { - num_rkeys = (krb5_int32) dbentp->n_key_data; - kret = admin_merge_keys(kcontext, - defaultp, - 0, - num_ekeys, - ekey_list, - (krb5_int32) - defaultp->n_key_data, - defaultp->key_data, - &num_rkeys, - &dbentp->key_data); - dbentp->n_key_data = (krb5_int16) num_rkeys; - } - } - } -#endif /* USE_KDB5_CPW */ + dbentp->len = defaultp->len; + kret = 0; - /* - * Finally, if this is a password change, clear the password-change - * required bit. - */ - if (password || is_pwchange) - dbentp->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE; - } + /* + * Update last password change (if appropriate) and modification + * date and principal. + */ + kret = key_update_tl_attrs(kcontext, dbentp, who, + (password || is_pwchange)); + if (kret) { + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> update_tl_attrs FAILED???")); + goto bailout; + } + /* See if this is a random key or not */ + if (password) { + krb5_data pwdata; + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> string-to-key\n")); + /* + * Now handle string-to-key and salt. + */ + pwdata.data = password; + pwdata.length = strlen(password); + + /* Convert password string to key */ + kret = key_string_to_keys(kcontext, ((is_pwchange) ? defaultp : dbentp), + &pwdata, 0, (krb5_key_salt_tuple *) NULL, + &num_keys, &key_list); + if (kret) { + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> pw true, key_string_to_keys FAILED???")); + goto bailout2; + } + /* Encrypt the keys */ + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> encode\n")); + num_ekeys = num_keys; + kret = key_encrypt_keys(kcontext, defaultp, &num_ekeys, + key_list, &ekey_list); + if (kret) { + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> pw true, key_encrypt_keys FAILED???")); + goto bailout2; + } + + num_rkeys = (krb5_int32) dbentp->n_key_data; + kret = admin_merge_keys(kcontext, defaultp, + 1, + num_ekeys, ekey_list, + (krb5_int32) defaultp->n_key_data, + defaultp->key_data, + &num_rkeys, &dbentp->key_data); + dbentp->n_key_data = (krb5_int16) num_rkeys; + + } else if (valid & KRB5_ADM_M_RANDOMKEY) { + /* Random key */ + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> random key\n")); + kret = key_random_key(kcontext, ((is_pwchange) ? defaultp : dbentp), + &num_keys, &key_list); + if (kret) { + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> pw false, key_random_key FAILED???")); + goto bailout2; + } + + /* Encrypt the keys */ + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> encode\n")); + num_ekeys = num_keys; + kret = key_encrypt_keys(kcontext, defaultp, &num_ekeys, key_list, + &ekey_list); + if (kret) { + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> pw false, key_encrypt_keys FAILED???")); + goto bailout2; + } + num_rkeys = (krb5_int32) dbentp->n_key_data; + kret = admin_merge_keys(kcontext, defaultp, + 0, + num_ekeys, ekey_list, + (krb5_int32) defaultp->n_key_data, + defaultp->key_data, + &num_rkeys, &dbentp->key_data); + dbentp->n_key_data = (krb5_int16) num_rkeys; + } else { + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> simple modify\n")); + kret = admin_merge_keys(kcontext, defaultp, + 0, /* only one list, so don't need unique */ + 0, 0, /* no keys in one list */ + (krb5_int32) defaultp->n_key_data, + defaultp->key_data, + &num_rkeys, &dbentp->key_data); + dbentp->n_key_data = (krb5_int16) num_rkeys; } + bailout2: + + /* + * Finally, if this is a password change, clear the password-change + * required bit. + */ + if (password || is_pwchange) + dbentp->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE; -#ifndef USE_KDB5_CPW + bailout: if (key_list) key_free_key_data(key_list, num_keys); if (ekey_list) key_free_key_data(ekey_list, num_ekeys); -#endif /* USE_KDB5_CPW */ DPRINT(DEBUG_CALLS, debug_level, ("X admin_merge_dbentries()=%d\n", kret)); return(kret); } @@ -502,13 +499,15 @@ admin_add_modify(kcontext, debug_level, ticket, nargs, arglist, char *new_password; krb5_int32 operation; const char *op_msg; -#ifdef USE_KDB5_CPW - krb5_int32 n_keysalts; - krb5_key_salt_tuple *keysalts; -#endif /* USE_KDB5_CPW */ #ifdef DEBUG char *dbg_op_msg; #endif /* DEBUG */ + int how_many; + krb5_boolean more; + krb5_data pword_data; + krb5_int32 temp; + krb5_db_entry *merge; + int nument; DPRINT(DEBUG_CALLS, debug_level, ("* admin_add_modify(%s)\n", arglist[0].data)); @@ -531,20 +530,17 @@ admin_add_modify(kcontext, debug_level, ticket, nargs, arglist, dbg_op_msg = (supp_pwd) ? "CHANGE PASSWORD" : "CHANGE RANDOM PASSWORD"; #endif /* DEBUG */ - } - else { + } else { operation = ACL_MODIFY_PRINCIPAL; op_msg = admin_modify_principal_text; #ifdef DEBUG dbg_op_msg = "MODIFY PRINCIPAL"; #endif /* DEBUG */ } - } - else { + } else { if (pwd_supplied) { return(KRB5_ADM_SYSTEM_ERROR); - } - else { + } else { operation = ACL_ADD_PRINCIPAL; op_msg = admin_add_principal_text; #ifdef DEBUG @@ -554,303 +550,174 @@ admin_add_modify(kcontext, debug_level, ticket, nargs, arglist, } /* Get the identity of our client */ - if (!(kret = admin_client_identity(kcontext, - debug_level, - ticket, - &client, - &client_name))) { - - /* See if this client can perform this operation. */ - if (acl_op_permitted(kcontext, client, operation, arglist[0].data)) { - - /* Parse the specified principal name */ - if (!(kret = krb5_parse_name(kcontext, - arglist[0].data, - &principal))) { - int how_many; - krb5_boolean more; - - how_many = 1; - - /* Try to get the entry */ - kret = krb5_db_get_principal(kcontext, - principal, - &cur_dbentry, - &how_many, - &more); - - /* - * If we're modifying, there'd better be an entry. - * If we're adding, there'd better not be an entry. - */ - if (!kret && - ((should_exist && how_many) || - (!should_exist && !how_many))) { - - /* We need to have a principal */ - new_dbentry.princ = principal; + kret = admin_client_identity(kcontext, debug_level, ticket, + &client, &client_name); + if (kret) { + /* We really choked here. */ + com_err(programname, kret, admin_no_cl_ident_fmt, op_msg); + retval = KRB5_ADM_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto bailout; + } - /* - * Parse the argument list and make sure that only valid - * options are set. - */ - if (!(kret = krb5_adm_proto_to_dbent(kcontext, - nargs-1, - &arglist[1], - &valid_mask, - &new_dbentry, - &new_password)) && - ((valid_mask & ~KRB5_ADM_M_SET_VALID) == 0)) { - krb5_data pword_data; - krb5_int32 temp; - - pword_data.data = (pwd_supplied) ? supp_pwd : - new_password; - pword_data.length = (pword_data.data) ? - strlen(pword_data.data) : 0; + /* See if this client can perform this operation. */ + if (!acl_op_permitted(kcontext, client, operation, arglist[0].data)) { + /* ACL check failed */ + com_err(programname, 0, admin_perm_denied_fmt, + op_msg, arglist[0].data, client_name); + retval = KRB5_ADM_NOT_AUTHORIZED; + goto bailout2; + } - /* - * Check viability of options specified. One - * of the following must be true: - * 1) randomkey was specified and no password. - * 2) randomkey is not specified and there - * is a password to change/set and it is - * is suitable. - * 3) randomkey is not specified and there is - * no password to change and this is - * is a modify entry request. - * - * Check the suitability of the new password, if - * one was supplied. - */ - if (((valid_mask & KRB5_ADM_M_RANDOMKEY) && - !pword_data.data) - || - (!(valid_mask & KRB5_ADM_M_RANDOMKEY) && - ((!pword_data.data && should_exist)|| - passwd_check_npass_ok(kcontext, - debug_level, - new_dbentry.princ, - &new_dbentry, - &pword_data, - &temp)))) { - krb5_db_entry *merge; - - merge = (should_exist) ? - &cur_dbentry : &admin_def_dbent; - - /* Merge the specified entries with the defaults */ - if (!(kret = admin_merge_dbentries(kcontext, - debug_level, - client, - merge, - valid_mask, - &new_dbentry, - pword_data.data, - pwd_supplied)) -#ifdef USE_KDB5_CPW - && - !(kret = key_dbent_to_keysalts(&new_dbentry, - &n_keysalts, - &keysalts)) -#endif /* USE_KDB5_CPW */ - ) { -#ifdef USE_KDB5_CPW - /* - * Determine if this is a random key or not. - */ - if ((valid_mask & KRB5_ADM_M_RANDOMKEY) || - (!pword_data.data && should_exist)) { - /* Random key */ - /* - * Determine if this is a change or a - * create operation. - */ - if (should_exist) { - new_dbentry.key_data = - cur_dbentry.key_data; - new_dbentry.n_key_data = - cur_dbentry.n_key_data; - cur_dbentry.key_data = - (krb5_key_data *) NULL; - cur_dbentry.n_key_data = 0; - kret = krb5_dbe_crk(kcontext, - key_master_encblock(), - keysalts, - n_keysalts, - &new_dbentry); - } - else - kret = krb5_dbe_ark(kcontext, - key_master_encblock(), - keysalts, - n_keysalts, - &new_dbentry); - } - else { - if (should_exist) { - new_dbentry.key_data = - cur_dbentry.key_data; - new_dbentry.n_key_data = - cur_dbentry.n_key_data; - cur_dbentry.key_data = - (krb5_key_data *) NULL; - cur_dbentry.n_key_data = 0; - kret = krb5_dbe_cpw(kcontext, - key_master_encblock(), - keysalts, - n_keysalts, - pword_data.data, - &new_dbentry); - } - else - kret = krb5_dbe_apw(kcontext, - key_master_encblock(), - keysalts, - n_keysalts, - pword_data.data, - &new_dbentry); - } - krb5_xfree(keysalts); - if (!kret) { -#endif /* USE_KDB5_CPW */ - int nument = 1; - - /* Write the entry. */ - kret = krb5_db_put_principal(kcontext, - &new_dbentry, - &nument); - if (kret || (nument != 1)) { - /* Ultimate failure */ - com_err(programname, kret, - admin_db_write_err_fmt, - op_msg, - client_name); - DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, - ("> db write failed for %s\n", - dbg_op_msg)); - retval = KRB5_ADM_SYSTEM_ERROR; - } - else { - /* Ultimate success */ - com_err(programname, 0, - admin_db_success_fmt, - op_msg, - arglist[0].data, - client_name); - } -#ifdef USE_KDB5_CPW - } - else { - /* - * Couldn't use the apw/cpw/ark/crk - */ - DPRINT(DEBUG_PROTO, debug_level, - ("= password set failed for %s\n", - dbg_op_msg)); - retval = KRB5_ADM_SYSTEM_ERROR; - } -#endif /* USE_KDB5_CPW */ + /* Parse the specified principal name */ + kret = krb5_parse_name(kcontext, arglist[0].data, &principal); + if (kret) { + /* Principal name parse failed */ + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, + ("> bad principal string \"%s\"\n", arglist[0].data)); + retval = (should_exist) ? KRB5_ADM_P_DOES_NOT_EXIST : + KRB5_ADM_BAD_OPTION; + goto bailout2; + } - /* - * Clean up droppings from - * admin_merge_dbentries - */ - } - else { - /* Option merge failed */ - DPRINT(DEBUG_PROTO, debug_level, - ("= option merge failed for %s\n", - dbg_op_msg)); - retval = KRB5_ADM_BAD_OPTION; - } - } - else { - /* Password was not suitable or conflicts */ - if (valid_mask & KRB5_ADM_M_RANDOMKEY) { - DPRINT(DEBUG_PROTO, debug_level, - ("= conflicting options for %s\n", - dbg_op_msg)); - retval = KRB5_ADM_BAD_OPTION; - } - else { - DPRINT(DEBUG_PROTO, debug_level, - ("= bad password for %s\n", - dbg_op_msg)); - retval = KRB5_ADM_PW_UNACCEPT; - } - } + how_many = 1; + /* Try to get the entry */ + kret = krb5_db_get_principal(kcontext, principal, &cur_dbentry, + &how_many, &more); - /* Clean up droppings from krb5_adm_proto_to_dbent */ - if (new_password) - krb5_xfree(new_password); - } - else { - /* Argument list parse failed or bad options */ - DPRINT(DEBUG_PROTO, debug_level, - ("= argument list bad for %s\n", dbg_op_msg)); - retval = KRB5_ADM_BAD_OPTION; - } - if (should_exist) - krb5_db_free_principal(kcontext, &cur_dbentry, 1); - krb5_db_free_principal(kcontext, &new_dbentry, 1); - principal = (krb5_principal) NULL; - } - else { - /* Database entry failed or yielded unexpected results */ - if (kret) { - DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, - ("> database read error\n")); - com_err(programname, kret, - admin_db_read_err_fmt, - op_msg, - client_name); - retval = KRB5_ADM_SYSTEM_ERROR; - } - else { - if (should_exist) { - DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, - ("> principal %s not in database\n", - arglist[0].data)); - retval = KRB5_ADM_P_DOES_NOT_EXIST; - } - else { - DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, - ("> principal %s already in database\n", - arglist[0].data)); - retval = KRB5_ADM_P_ALREADY_EXISTS; - } - } - } + /* + * If we're modifying, there'd better be an entry. + * If we're adding, there'd better not be an entry. + */ + if (kret) { + /* Database entry failed or yielded unexpected results */ + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, ("> database read error\n")); + com_err(programname, kret, + admin_db_read_err_fmt, op_msg, client_name); + retval = KRB5_ADM_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto bailout3; + } + if (should_exist && !how_many) { + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, + ("> principal %s not in database\n", arglist[0].data)); + retval = KRB5_ADM_P_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + goto bailout3; + } + if (!should_exist && how_many) { + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, + ("> principal %s already in database\n", arglist[0].data)); + retval = KRB5_ADM_P_ALREADY_EXISTS; + goto bailout3; + } - /* Clean up from krb5_parse_name (If left over) */ - if (principal) - krb5_free_principal(kcontext, principal); - } - else { - /* Principal name parse failed */ - DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, - ("> bad principal string \"%s\"\n", arglist[0].data)); - retval = (should_exist) ? KRB5_ADM_P_DOES_NOT_EXIST : - KRB5_ADM_BAD_OPTION; - } - } - else { - /* ACL check failed */ - com_err(programname, 0, admin_perm_denied_fmt, - op_msg, arglist[0].data, client_name); - retval = KRB5_ADM_NOT_AUTHORIZED; - } + /* We need to have a principal */ + /* new_dbentry.princ = principal; */ + krb5_copy_principal(kcontext, principal, &(new_dbentry.princ)); + + /* + * Parse the argument list and make sure that only valid + * options are set. + */ + kret = krb5_adm_proto_to_dbent(kcontext, + nargs-1, &arglist[1], &valid_mask, + &new_dbentry, &new_password); + if (kret || (valid_mask & ~KRB5_ADM_M_SET_VALID)) { + /* Argument list parse failed or bad options */ + DPRINT(DEBUG_PROTO, debug_level, + ("= argument list bad for %s\n", dbg_op_msg)); + retval = KRB5_ADM_BAD_OPTION; + goto bailout4; + } + + pword_data.data = (pwd_supplied) ? supp_pwd : new_password; + pword_data.length = (pword_data.data) ? strlen(pword_data.data) : 0; + + /* + * Check viability of options specified. One + * of the following must be true: + * 1) randomkey was specified and no password. + * 2) randomkey is not specified and there + * is a password to change/set and it is + * is suitable. + * 3) randomkey is not specified and there is + * no password to change and this is + * is a modify entry request. + * + * Check the suitability of the new password, if + * one was supplied. + */ - /* Clean up admin_client_identity droppings */ - krb5_xfree(client_name); - krb5_free_principal(kcontext, client); + if ((valid_mask & KRB5_ADM_M_RANDOMKEY) && pword_data.data) { + /* claimed random key but gave a password */ + DPRINT(DEBUG_PROTO, debug_level, + ("= conflicting options for %s\n", dbg_op_msg)); + retval = KRB5_ADM_BAD_OPTION; + goto bailout5; } - else { - /* We really choked here. */ - com_err(programname, kret, admin_no_cl_ident_fmt, op_msg); - retval = KRB5_ADM_SYSTEM_ERROR; + if (!(valid_mask & KRB5_ADM_M_RANDOMKEY) + && pword_data.data + && !passwd_check_npass_ok(kcontext, debug_level, + new_dbentry.princ, &new_dbentry, + &pword_data, &temp) + ) { + DPRINT(DEBUG_PROTO, debug_level, + ("= bad password for %s\n", dbg_op_msg)); + retval = KRB5_ADM_PW_UNACCEPT; + goto bailout5; } + + merge = (should_exist) ? &cur_dbentry : &admin_def_dbent; + + /* Merge the specified entries with the defaults */ + kret = admin_merge_dbentries(kcontext, debug_level, + client, merge, valid_mask, + &new_dbentry, pword_data.data, + pwd_supplied); + if (kret) { /* Option merge failed */ + DPRINT(DEBUG_PROTO, debug_level, + ("= option merge failed for %s\n", dbg_op_msg)); + retval = KRB5_ADM_BAD_OPTION; + goto bailout5; + } + nument = 1; + + /* Write the entry. */ + kret = krb5_db_put_principal(kcontext, &new_dbentry, &nument); + if (kret || (nument != 1)) { + /* Ultimate failure */ + com_err(programname, kret, admin_db_write_err_fmt, op_msg, client_name); + DPRINT(DEBUG_OPERATION, debug_level, + ("> db write failed for %s\n", dbg_op_msg)); + retval = KRB5_ADM_SYSTEM_ERROR; + } else { + /* Ultimate success */ + com_err(programname, 0, admin_db_success_fmt, + op_msg, arglist[0].data, client_name); + } + + bailout5: + /* Clean up droppings from krb5_adm_proto_to_dbent */ + if (new_password) { + krb5_xfree(new_password); + new_password = 0; + } + + bailout4: + if (should_exist) + krb5_db_free_principal(kcontext, &cur_dbentry, 1); + krb5_db_free_principal(kcontext, &new_dbentry, 1); + principal = (krb5_principal) NULL; + + bailout3: + /* Clean up from krb5_parse_name (If left over) */ + if (principal) + krb5_free_principal(kcontext, principal); + + bailout2: + /* Clean up admin_client_identity droppings */ + krb5_xfree(client_name); + krb5_free_principal(kcontext, client); + + bailout: DPRINT(DEBUG_CALLS, debug_level, ("X admin_add_modify() = %d\n", retval)); return(retval); @@ -1614,8 +1481,8 @@ admin_add_principal(kcontext, debug_level, ticket, nargs, arglist) ticket, nargs, arglist, - 0, - 0, + 0, /* should exist */ + 0, /* passwd supplied */ (char *) NULL); DPRINT(DEBUG_CALLS, debug_level, ("X admin_add_principal() = %d\n", retval)); @@ -1692,8 +1559,8 @@ admin_modify_principal(kcontext, debug_level, ticket, nargs, arglist) ticket, nargs, arglist, - 1, - 0, + 1, /* should exist */ + 0, /* passwd supplied */ (char *) NULL); DPRINT(DEBUG_CALLS, debug_level, ("X admin_modify_principal() = %d\n", retval)); @@ -1719,8 +1586,8 @@ admin_change_opwd(kcontext, debug_level, ticket, principal, password) ticket, 1, principal, - 1, - 1, + 1, /* should exist */ + 1, /* passwd supplied */ password->data); DPRINT(DEBUG_CALLS, debug_level, ("X admin_change_opw() = %d\n", retval)); @@ -1745,8 +1612,8 @@ admin_change_orandpwd(kcontext, debug_level, ticket, principal) ticket, 1, principal, - 1, - 1, + 1, /* should exist */ + 1, /* passwd supplied */ (char *) NULL); DPRINT(DEBUG_CALLS, debug_level, ("X admin_change_orandpw() = %d\n", retval)); diff --git a/src/kadmin/v5server/kadm5_defs.h b/src/kadmin/v5server/kadm5_defs.h index 88d83c5c1..80f46f020 100644 --- a/src/kadmin/v5server/kadm5_defs.h +++ b/src/kadmin/v5server/kadm5_defs.h @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ #define DEBUG_CALLS 128 #define DEBUG_NOSLAVES 256 #ifdef DEBUG -#define DPRINT(l1, cl, al) if ((cl & l1) != 0) printf al +#define DPRINT(l1, cl, al) if ((cl & l1) != 0) xprintf al #else /* DEBUG */ #define DPRINT(l1, cl, al) #endif /* DEBUG */ diff --git a/src/kadmin/v5server/srv_main.c b/src/kadmin/v5server/srv_main.c index fce7129ea..042c432fe 100644 --- a/src/kadmin/v5server/srv_main.c +++ b/src/kadmin/v5server/srv_main.c @@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ #include #include #include +#if defined(HAVE_STDARG_H) || defined(_WINDOWS) || defined (_MACINTOSH) +#include +#else +#include +#define VARARGS +#endif #include "k5-int.h" #include "com_err.h" #include "adm.h" @@ -92,6 +98,42 @@ unhandled_signal(signo) /* NOTREACHED */ } +#ifdef DEBUG +#ifndef VARARGS +void xprintf(const char *str, ...) +{ +#else +void xprintf(va_alist) + va_dcl +{ + const char *str; +#endif + va_list pvar; + FILE* xfd; + static opened = 0; + time_t t = time(0); + +#ifdef VARARGS + va_start (pvar); + str = va_arg (pvar, const char *); +#else + va_start(pvar, str); +#endif + xfd = fopen("kadmind5-xprintf.log","a"); + if (!xfd) perror("xfd"); + else { + if (!opened) { + opened = 1; + fprintf(xfd, "starting log pid %d time %s\n", getpid(), ctime(&t)); + } + vfprintf(xfd,str,pvar); + fflush(xfd); + fclose(xfd); + } + va_end(pvar); +} +#endif /* DEBUG */ + int main(argc, argv) int argc; diff --git a/src/kadmin/v5server/srv_net.c b/src/kadmin/v5server/srv_net.c index dd1b76476..75ce3beb3 100644 --- a/src/kadmin/v5server/srv_net.c +++ b/src/kadmin/v5server/srv_net.c @@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ net_init(kcontext, debug_level, port) goto done; } if (!(our_hostent = gethostbyname(our_host_name))) { - kret = errno; + kret = KRB5_ERR_BAD_HOSTNAME; /* perhaps put h_errno in the msg */ fprintf(stderr, net_no_hostent_fmt, programname, error_message(kret)); goto done; }