From: Ken Raeburn <raeburn@mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2003 23:52:04 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: * sendauth.c (krb_net_rd_sendauth): Arg raw_len now points to KRB4_32; don't
X-Git-Tag: krb5-1.3-alpha1~153
X-Git-Url: http://git.tremily.us/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=5cc39e35ba360e767fbbe433c5d7119619675e9c;p=krb5.git

* sendauth.c (krb_net_rd_sendauth): Arg raw_len now points to KRB4_32; don't
cast it to pointer to unsigned long.  Change ld.so warning message check to be
byte-order independent.
* krb4int.h (krb_net_rd_sendauth): Decl updated.

git-svn-id: svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5/trunk@15124 dc483132-0cff-0310-8789-dd5450dbe970
---

diff --git a/src/lib/krb4/ChangeLog b/src/lib/krb4/ChangeLog
index 735b4204d..e43bd5901 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb4/ChangeLog
+++ b/src/lib/krb4/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+2003-01-15  Ken Raeburn  <raeburn@mit.edu>
+
+	* sendauth.c (krb_net_rd_sendauth): Arg raw_len now points to
+	KRB4_32; don't cast it to pointer to unsigned long.  Change ld.so
+	warning message check to be byte-order independent.
+	* krb4int.h (krb_net_rd_sendauth): Decl updated.
+
 2003-01-15  Tom Yu  <tlyu@mit.edu>
 
 	* CCache-glue.c: New file from KfM.
diff --git a/src/lib/krb4/krb4int.h b/src/lib/krb4/krb4int.h
index 82a66f649..1c7ab9f79 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb4/krb4int.h
+++ b/src/lib/krb4/krb4int.h
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int krb_rd_preauth(KTEXT, char *, int, Principal *, des_cblock);
 #endif
 
 /* sendauth.c */
-int krb_net_rd_sendauth(int, KTEXT, char *);
+int krb_net_rd_sendauth(int, KTEXT, KRB4_32 *);
 
 /* stime.c */
 char *krb_stime(long *);
diff --git a/src/lib/krb4/sendauth.c b/src/lib/krb4/sendauth.c
index e4c8da7e6..d4ae44ef3 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb4/sendauth.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb4/sendauth.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int
 krb_net_rd_sendauth (fd, reply, raw_len)
      int fd;			/* file descriptor to write onto */
      KTEXT reply;		/* Where we put the reply message */
-     char *raw_len;		/* Where to read the length field info */
+     KRB4_32 *raw_len;		/* Where to read the length field info */
 {
     KRB4_32 tkt_len;
     int got;
@@ -145,8 +145,7 @@ krb_net_rd_sendauth (fd, reply, raw_len)
        when it starts up.  We just ignore any such message and keep
        going.  This doesn't affect security: we just require the
        ticket to follow the warning message.  */
-    if ((*(unsigned long *)raw_len
-	 == (('l' << 24) | ('d' << 16) | ('.' << 8) | 's'))) {
+    if (!memcmp("ld.s", raw_len, 4)) {
     	char c;
 
 	while (krb_net_read(fd, &c, 1) == 1 && c != '\n')
@@ -154,7 +153,7 @@ krb_net_rd_sendauth (fd, reply, raw_len)
 	goto reread;
     }
 
-    tkt_len = ntohl(*(unsigned long *)raw_len);
+    tkt_len = ntohl(*raw_len);
 
     /* if the length is negative, the server failed to recognize us. */
     if ((tkt_len < 0) || (tkt_len > sizeof(reply->dat)))