From: Tom Yu Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2011 22:17:26 +0000 (+0000) Subject: pull up r24640 from trunk X-Git-Tag: krb5-1.9.1-beta1~7 X-Git-Url: http://git.tremily.us/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=028125b8c2ba963cb28710de68706b2bb14c6c3b;p=krb5.git pull up r24640 from trunk ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r24640 | ghudson | 2011-02-16 18:34:37 -0500 (Wed, 16 Feb 2011) | 14 lines ticket: 6870 subject: Don't reject AP-REQs based on PACs target_version: 1.9.1 tags: pullup Experience has shown that it was a mistake to fail AP-REQ verification based on failure to verify the signature of PAC authdata contained in the ticket. We've had two rounds of interoperability issues with the hmac-md5 checksum code, an interoperability issue OSX generating unsigned PACs, and another problem where PACs are copied by older KDCs from a cross-realm TGT into the service ticket. If a PAC signature cannot be verified, just don't mark it as verified and continue on with the AP exchange. ticket: 6870 version_fixed: 1.9.1 status: resolved git-svn-id: svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5/branches/krb5-1-9@24647 dc483132-0cff-0310-8789-dd5450dbe970 --- diff --git a/src/include/k5-trace.h b/src/include/k5-trace.h index 1bd4b4451..b85e59c7d 100644 --- a/src/include/k5-trace.h +++ b/src/include/k5-trace.h @@ -194,9 +194,8 @@ TRACE(c, (c, "Negotiating for enctypes in authenticator: {etypes}", \ etypes)) -#define TRACE_MSPAC_NOSRVCKSUM(c) \ - TRACE(c, (c, "MS PAC lacks a server checksum. "\ - "Apple Open Directory bug?")) +#define TRACE_MSPAC_VERIFY_FAIL(c, err) \ + TRACE(c, (c, "PAC checksum verification failed: {kerr}", err)) #define TRACE_MSPAC_DISCARD_UNVERF(c) \ TRACE(c, (c, "Filtering out unverified MS PAC")) diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c index 47b3a3b91..067bb17c6 100644 --- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c +++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c @@ -637,17 +637,8 @@ krb5_pac_verify(krb5_context context, return EINVAL; ret = k5_pac_verify_server_checksum(context, pac, server); - if (ret == ENOENT) { - /* - * Apple Mac OS X Server Open Directory KDC (at least 10.6) - * appears to provide a PAC that lacks a server checksum. - */ - TRACE_MSPAC_NOSRVCKSUM(context); - pac->verified = FALSE; - return ret; - } else if (ret != 0) { + if (ret != 0) return ret; - } if (privsvr != NULL) { ret = k5_pac_verify_kdc_checksum(context, pac, privsvr); @@ -804,35 +795,20 @@ mspac_verify(krb5_context kcontext, if (pacctx->pac == NULL) return EINVAL; - code = krb5_pac_verify(kcontext, - pacctx->pac, + code = krb5_pac_verify(kcontext, pacctx->pac, req->ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime, - req->ticket->enc_part2->client, - key, - NULL); - - /* - * If the server checksum is not found, return success to - * krb5int_authdata_verify() to work around an apparent Open - * Directory bug. Non-verified PACs won't be returned by - * mspac_get_attribute(). - */ - if (code == ENOENT && !pacctx->pac->verified) { - code = 0; - } + req->ticket->enc_part2->client, key, NULL); + if (code != 0) + TRACE_MSPAC_VERIFY_FAIL(kcontext, code); -#if 0 /* - * Now, we could return 0 and just set pac->verified to FALSE. - * Thoughts? + * If the above verification failed, don't fail the whole authentication, + * just don't mark the PAC as verified. A checksum mismatch can occur if + * the PAC was copied from a cross-realm TGT by an ignorant KDC, and Apple + * Mac OS X Server Open Directory (as of 10.6) generates PACs with no + * server checksum at all. */ - if (code == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY) { - assert(pacctx->pac->verified == FALSE); - code = 0; - } -#endif - - return code; + return 0; } static void