restore legacy behavior for read_sha1_file()

Since commit 8eca0b47ff1598a6d163df9358c0e0c9bd92d4c8, it is possible
for read_sha1_file() to return NULL even with existing objects when they
are corrupted.  Previously a corrupted object would have terminated the
program immediately, effectively making read_sha1_file() return NULL
only when specified object is not found.

Let's restore this behavior for all users of read_sha1_file() and
provide a separate function with the ability to not terminate when
bad objects are encountered.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

diff --git a/cache.h b/cache.h
index 0d8eddac778ace8e4b5f58459f508ac1192dbcff..a8254e2f9e076b2b69dd214379578e6fc065ddcc 100644 (file)
--- a/cache.h
+++ b/cache.h
@@ -538,6 +538,9 @@ extern int write_sha1_file(void *buf, unsigned long len, const char *type, unsig
 extern int pretend_sha1_file(void *, unsigned long, enum object_type, unsigned char *);
 extern int force_object_loose(const unsigned char *sha1, time_t mtime);
 
+/* just like read_sha1_file(), but non fatal in presence of bad objects */
+extern void *read_object(const unsigned char *sha1, enum object_type *type, unsigned long *size);
+
 extern int check_sha1_signature(const unsigned char *sha1, void *buf, unsigned long size, const char *type);
 
 extern int move_temp_to_file(const char *tmpfile, const char *filename);

diff --git a/sha1_file.c b/sha1_file.c
index 2df78b5afd57cf8e86f01134bf6c49d74defc52a..e281c14f01d37ab7623998c2990914aca49a7a3b 100644 (file)
--- a/sha1_file.c
+++ b/sha1_file.c
@@ -1006,6 +1006,18 @@ static void mark_bad_packed_object(struct packed_git *p,
        p->num_bad_objects++;
 }
 
+static int has_packed_and_bad(const unsigned char *sha1)
+{
+       struct packed_git *p;
+       unsigned i;
+
+       for (p = packed_git; p; p = p->next)
+               for (i = 0; i < p->num_bad_objects; i++)
+                       if (!hashcmp(sha1, p->bad_object_sha1 + 20 * i))
+                               return 1;
+       return 0;
+}
+
 int check_sha1_signature(const unsigned char *sha1, void *map, unsigned long size, const char *type)
 {
        unsigned char real_sha1[20];
@@ -1647,7 +1659,7 @@ static void *unpack_delta_entry(struct packed_git *p,
                      sha1_to_hex(base_sha1), (uintmax_t)base_offset,
                      p->pack_name);
                mark_bad_packed_object(p, base_sha1);
-               base = read_sha1_file(base_sha1, type, &base_size);
+               base = read_object(base_sha1, type, &base_size);
                if (!base)
                        return NULL;
        }
@@ -1945,7 +1957,7 @@ static void *read_packed_sha1(const unsigned char *sha1,
                error("failed to read object %s at offset %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
                      sha1_to_hex(sha1), (uintmax_t)e.offset, e.p->pack_name);
                mark_bad_packed_object(e.p, sha1);
-               data = read_sha1_file(sha1, type, size);
+               data = read_object(sha1, type, size);
        }
        return data;
 }
@@ -2010,8 +2022,8 @@ int pretend_sha1_file(void *buf, unsigned long len, enum object_type type,
        return 0;
 }
 
-void *read_sha1_file(const unsigned char *sha1, enum object_type *type,
-                    unsigned long *size)
+void *read_object(const unsigned char *sha1, enum object_type *type,
+                 unsigned long *size)
 {
        unsigned long mapsize;
        void *map, *buf;
@@ -2037,6 +2049,16 @@ void *read_sha1_file(const unsigned char *sha1, enum object_type *type,
        return read_packed_sha1(sha1, type, size);
 }
 
+void *read_sha1_file(const unsigned char *sha1, enum object_type *type,
+                    unsigned long *size)
+{
+       void *data = read_object(sha1, type, size);
+       /* legacy behavior is to die on corrupted objects */
+       if (!data && (has_loose_object(sha1) || has_packed_and_bad(sha1)))
+               die("object %s is corrupted", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
+       return data;
+}
+
 void *read_object_with_reference(const unsigned char *sha1,
                                 const char *required_type_name,
                                 unsigned long *size,

diff --git a/t/t6011-rev-list-with-bad-commit.sh b/t/t6011-rev-list-with-bad-commit.sh
new file mode 100755 (executable)
index 0000000..e51eb41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/t/t6011-rev-list-with-bad-commit.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+test_description='git rev-list should notice bad commits'
+
+. ./test-lib.sh
+
+# Note:
+# - compression level is set to zero to make "corruptions" easier to perform
+# - reflog is disabled to avoid extra references which would twart the test
+
+test_expect_success 'setup' \
+   '
+   git init &&
+   git config core.compression 0 &&
+   git config core.logallrefupdates false &&
+   echo "foo" > foo &&
+   git add foo &&
+   git commit -m "first commit" &&
+   echo "bar" > bar &&
+   git add bar &&
+   git commit -m "second commit" &&
+   echo "baz" > baz &&
+   git add baz &&
+   git commit -m "third commit" &&
+   echo "foo again" >> foo &&
+   git add foo &&
+   git commit -m "fourth commit" &&
+   git repack -a -f -d
+   '
+
+test_expect_success 'verify number of revisions' \
+   '
+   revs=$(git rev-list --all | wc -l) &&
+   test $revs -eq 4 &&
+   first_commit=$(git rev-parse HEAD~3)
+   '
+
+test_expect_success 'corrupt second commit object' \
+   '
+   perl -i.bak -pe "s/second commit/socond commit/" .git/objects/pack/*.pack &&
+   test_must_fail git fsck --full
+   '
+
+test_expect_success 'rev-list should fail' \
+   '
+   test_must_fail git rev-list --all > /dev/null
+   '
+
+test_expect_success 'git repack _MUST_ fail' \
+   '
+   test_must_fail git repack -a -f -d
+   '
+
+test_expect_success 'first commit is still available' \
+   '
+   git log $first_commit
+   '
+
+test_done
+