cli/crypto: treat failure to create a crypto context as fatal.

Silently ignoring signed/encrypted parts seems like the wrong idea,
and it also complicates future gmime-3.0 compatibility changes.

diff --git a/mime-node.c b/mime-node.c
index f719422ec678bbe340cd670861bb5cf0b0ca347e..7363e2224026e0d206247e2777f6aee368d9957f 100644 (file)
--- a/mime-node.c
+++ b/mime-node.c
@@ -245,10 +245,12 @@ _mime_node_create (mime_node_t *parent, GMimeObject *part)
        GMimeContentType *content_type = g_mime_object_get_content_type (part);
        const char *protocol = g_mime_content_type_get_parameter (content_type, "protocol");
        cryptoctx = notmuch_crypto_get_context (node->ctx->crypto, protocol);
+       if (!cryptoctx)
+           return NULL;
     }
 
     /* Handle PGP/MIME parts */
-    if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part) && node->ctx->crypto->decrypt && cryptoctx) {
+    if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part) && node->ctx->crypto->decrypt) {
        if (node->nchildren != 2) {
            /* this violates RFC 3156 section 4, so we won't bother with it. */
            fprintf (stderr, "Error: %d part(s) for a multipart/encrypted "
@@ -257,7 +259,7 @@ _mime_node_create (mime_node_t *parent, GMimeObject *part)
        } else {
            node_decrypt_and_verify (node, part, cryptoctx);
        }
-    } else if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_SIGNED (part) && node->ctx->crypto->verify && cryptoctx) {
+    } else if (GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_SIGNED (part) && node->ctx->crypto->verify) {
        if (node->nchildren != 2) {
            /* this violates RFC 3156 section 5, so we won't bother with it. */
            fprintf (stderr, "Error: %d part(s) for a multipart/signed message "