X-Git-Url: http://git.tremily.us/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=security.txt;h=e217720979ea47b9a70d1e22255a9b96635842c3;hb=f52ae77db0199703e10101b985ec1ab4af26f288;hp=01b0132c01a4bf31fc82301078752f9990639d00;hpb=51ec6f08a04ee99d9dbdfdf09fda60cb83402915;p=irker.git

diff --git a/security.txt b/security.txt
index 01b0132..e217720 100644
--- a/security.txt
+++ b/security.txt
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ ineffective - just sets a target for the DoS attack.
 
 3. Limit the number of requests that can be queued by source IP address.
 This might be worth doing; it would stymie a single-source DoS attack through
-a publicly-exposed irkerd, though not a DDoS by a bitnet.  But there isn't
+a publicly-exposed irkerd, though not a DDoS by a botnet.  But there isn't
 a lot of win here for a properly installed irker (e.g. behind a firewall), 
 which is typically going to get all its requests from a single repo host
 anyway.
@@ -180,14 +180,14 @@ for a godawful amount of code bloat.
 The deployment advice in the installation instructions assumes that 
 irkerd submitters are "authenticated" by being inside a firewall - that is,
 mesages are issued from an intranet and it can be trusted that anyone 
-issuing messages from within a given intrenet is authorized to do so.
+issuing messages from within a given intranet is authorized to do so.
 This fits the assumption that irker instances will run on forge sites
 receiving requests from instances of irkerhook.py.
 
 If this is *not* the case (e.g. the network between a hook and irkerd
 has to be considered hostile) we could hide irkerd behind an instance
 of spiped <http://www.tarsnap.com/spiped.html> or an instance of
-stunnel <http://www.stunnel.orgproxy>. These would be far superior to
+stunnel <http://www.stunnel.org>. These would be far superior to
 in-band authentication in that they would leave the job to specialist
 code not in any way coupled to irkerd's internals, minimizing
 global complexity and failure modes.
@@ -196,10 +196,10 @@ One larger issue (not unique to irker) is that because of the
 insecured nature of IRC it is essentially impossible to secure
 #commits against commit notifications that are either garbled by
 software errors and misconfigurations or maliciously crafted to
-confuse anyone attempting to gather statistics from that.  The lesson
-here is that IRC monitoring isn't a good method for that purpose;
-going direct to the repositories via a toolkit such as Ohloh is
-a far better idea.
+confuse anyone attempting to gather statistics from that channel.  The
+lesson here is that IRC monitoring isn't a good method for that
+purpose; going direct to the repositories via a toolkit such as Ohloh
+is a far better idea.
 
 === Future directions ===